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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Notwithstanding the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
many defined benefit pension plans continue to backload severely the accrual 
of their workers' pension benefits. This backloading no longer takes the form 
of long service requirements for vesting; rather it is achieved through the use 
of early retirement benefit reduction provisions and early retirement supplemen 
tal benefits. These features produce, in many cases, the same effect as pre- 
ERISA vesting requirements, namely, that workers who leave employment, 
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, prior to a specified age or prior to hav 
ing a specified amount of service, may leave with quite small pension benefits.
In addition to backloading their pension benefits, many firms appear to use 
their pensions to provide major incentives for workers to leave the firm after 
a specified age or amount of service. These retirement incentives (old age work 
disincentives) are often quite large when compared with social security's old 
age work disincentives. The pension thus becomes, for older workers, the stick 
to get them to retire and thereby give up the wage carrot.
This monograph documents the continued backloading of pension benefits 
and the extent of retirement incentives by examining pension accrual in a large 
sample of U.S. defined benefit pension plans and in one large Fortune 500 
firm. In the case of the large Fortune 500 firm, it is possible to link the retire 
ment behavior of workers to the retirement incentives associated with the firm's 
pension plan.
The monograph begins by defining pension accrual and describing the fac 
tors that influence this form of employee compensation. In so doing, it points 
out the remarkable variety in pension accrual that can arise because of dif 
ferences in pension provisions and economic circumstances such as the growth 
rate of employee wages or the interest rate. Pension accrual may not only dif 
fer greatly across firms because of differences in pension plans and across 
time because of differences in economic circumstances, but also across workers 
within a firm who have different amounts of service, different mortality prob 
abilities, and are of different ages.
While pension accrual is typically a small component of total employee com 
pensation, at some ages and depending on the pension plan, it can easily repre 
sent as much as one-half to two-thirds of total compensation. At certain ages 
it can also reduce total compensation by such magnitudes. The fact that large 
changes occur from one year to the next hi a worker's pension accrual without 
a concommitant offsetting change in nonpension compensation indicates that 
the labor market cannot be viewed as clearing on an annual basis; i.e., the 
size of pension accrual rules out the possibility that workers are paid each year
what they produce that year. In ruling out such an annual spot market view 
of the labor market, the data appear to rule in the only alternative view, name 
ly, that the labor market clears on a long-term implicit contractual basis.
In addition to telling us something about the nature of labor markets, the 
large magnitudes of pension accrual at specific ages suggests the need for 
employers to track carefully the pension benefits accruing to each worker. As 
the appendicies to the monograph show, such tracking requires careful actuarial 
calculations that are sensitive to the fine details of the pension plan.
The monograph reports the results of such painstaking actuarial calculations 
for over 1500 U.S. defined benefit plans. These calculations indicate that many 
plans exhibit significant backloading and most plans generate substantial retire 
ment incentives, often at the plan's age of early retirement. The extent of 
backloading and retirement incentives differs widely across firms. While there 
are some differences, on average, in backloading and retirement incentives 
across industries and occupations, these differences are due primarily to dif 
ferent choices of early and normal retirement ages. For example, early and 
normal retirement at age 55 is quite common among firms in the transporta 
tion industry, and accounts for most of the differences, on average, between 
pension accrual in transportation and other industries such as manufacturing.
The analysis of the retirement response to the large Fortune 500 company's 
pension plan yields quite strong findings. The plan is highly backoaded, with 
most of the benefits accruing in the year the worker reaches age 55, the plan's 
age of early retirement. The plan also provides a very substantial incentive 
to retire at age 55 or shortly thereafter; it does so by greatly reducing pension 
accrual after age 55 and indeed, depending on the worker's service, making 
pension accrual significantly negative after age 55. The data reveal a very strong 
retirement response to the plan's retirement incentives. Before workers reach 
age 55, departure rates are typically around 2 percent. At age 55 they jump 
to 10 percent or more. Between age 55 and 60 they remain above 10 percent 
and increase again at age 60. In total, it appears that the pension plan is in 
creasing the extent of early retirement between ages 55 and 60 by roughly 
one-third.
Given the rapid aging of the U.S. workforce and the growing concern with 
old age income security, it may be time to take another look at government 
policy concerning private pension plans. In the absence of new approaches 
to the retirement incentives of private pensions, government policies design 
ed to increase labor force participation of the elderly by, for example, alter 
ing social security may prove highly ineffectual.
VI
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Private pensions are playing an increasingly important role in the 
U.S. economy. Almost half of the U.S. workforce is currently par 
ticipating in a private, state, or local pension plan, and almost a 
third of current retirees are recipients of pension benefits. Pension 
funds hold over 10 percent of U.S. financial assets, and pension lia 
bilities represent a major source of business debt.
Much of the growth in private pensions has occurred in the last 
three decades. During this period, and especially in the last decade, 
the labor force participation of older workers had declined dramati 
cally. While much of this trend may be due to higher incomes cou 
pled with a desire for increased leisure, it appears that the retirement 
incentives of private pensions may also be inducing widespread re 
tirement. For older workers covered by private pensions, pension ac 
crual is typically substantial prior to specific ages and then becomes 
significantly negative after these ages. Such accrual profiles provide 
very substantial incentives to retire. Such incentives are the primary 
focus of this monograph.
Analysis of pension accrual can also provide insight into the struc 
ture of the labor market. Many economists view the labor market as 
primarily a spot market in which a worker is paid each year for work 
done that year; others view employers and workers as entering into 
long-term contractual arrangements which may be implicit as well as 
explicit. Under such arrangements, compensation for work done in 
the present may be paid in the future. Information on pension ac 
crual can provide information on the empirical relevance of the con 
tract versus spot market views of the labor market.
A third important reason for studying pension accrual concerns 
government policy towards "pension backloading." Pension back- 
loading refers to pension plans that provide very little pension ac 
crual up to a specific age and substantial pension accrual after a
1
2 Introduction
specific age. This feature of pension plans typically means that pen 
sion benefits are much smaller for employees who change jobs than 
for those who don't, holding earnings constant. Much of the regula 
tion of vesting rules contained in ERISA, the Employees Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, and in subsequent legislation reflects 
an effort to limit pension backloading. Despite these and related ef 
forts, backloading remains a feature of a large fraction of defined 
benefit pension plans. The backloading under current plans is due to 
quite typical age-related and service-related provisions of normal and 
early retirement benefit formulae.
Other reasons for studying pension accrual include worker mobil 
ity, sex and age discrimination, firm valuation, and proper disclosure 
to workers of pension benefit information. Clearly, if the labor mar 
ket is best characterized as a long-term contractual arrangement be 
tween workers and firms, then the future path of pension accrual is 
an important element of that contract. If future pension accrual is 
substantial, workers may be effectively "locked in" to their present 
firm. Thus, workers approaching the age of full vesting or of sub 
stantial pension accrual may delay switching jobs until they have ex 
hausted pension accrual on their current jobs. Others may change 
jobs without fully appreciating the loss in potential pension accrual 
that such change entails.
Since defined benefit pension formulae are sex blind and since 
women typically live longer than men, the pension cost of employing 
women may exceed that for men in many firms. If firms are unable 
to pay women a smaller nonpension compensation, the total labor 
cost of hiring women will exceed that of hiring men and may miti 
gate against employment of women. Pension accrual also differs due 
to the age of the worker. If newly hired older workers accrue pension 
benefits at a faster rate than newly hired younger workers, and if 
firms cannot pay older workers less than younger workers, then 
firms may be less willing to hire older workers. Knowledge of 
vested pension accrual is of obvious importance to the proper valu 
ation of firms since accrued vested benefits are a financial liability. 
While the accountants and actuaries of major U.S. corporations and 
unincorporated businesses calculate aggregate accrued vested liabili-
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ties, the accounting procedures vary widely. In addition, knowledge 
of a firm's overall liability is different from knowledge of the pen 
sion accrual of its particular workers. The complexity of pension 
benefit formulae calls into question whether employers and personnel 
managers fully understand the nature of pension compensation. The 
complexity also suggests that workers may not understand the extent 
of pension accrual. If workers are overvaluing their pension benefits, 
they may be accepting too little in the form of nonpension compen 
sation. Alternatively, they may undervalue their pension benefits and 
seek too much in nonpension compensation. The complexity of pen 
sion accrual suggests the need for annual statements indicating each 
worker's accrued benefit and providing projections about future 
accrual.
This monograph examines pension accruals, both their size and 
their incentive effects, particularly with respect to retirement behav 
ior. It combines (in parts of chapters 2, 3 and 4 and appendices I and 
II) the results of our previous research (Kotlikoff and Wise 1985 and 
1987) on pension accrual in U.S. firms, with new findings (reported 
in chapters 5 and 6 and appendix III) on pension accrual and retire 
ment behavior in one very large U.S. firm. The analysis relies pri 
marily on two sources of data. The first is the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' 1979 Level of Benefits Survey (BLS-LOB). This survey of 
1469 establishments with 3,386,121 pension participants, provides 
extremely detailed information concerning pension benefits, vesting, 
and early retirement formulae, all of which are crucial inputs to the 
calculation of pension accruals. The second data set, denoted here as 
FIRM, contains the complete work histories of over 122,000 em 
ployees who were working at some time during the period 1981- 
1984 for a large Fortune 500 company. While the name of this 
company cannot be revealed, the company is in the service industry.
The BLS-LOB data are useful for exhibiting typical patterns of 
pension accrual as well as indicating variations across pension plans 
in accrual patterns. The FIRM data can be used to study the retire 
ment response to age-pension-accrual profiles.
The monograph is organized as follows. The remainder of this 
introduction discusses more fully three key issues motivating the
4 Introduction
analysis of pension accrual. The first is the trend toward early retire 
ment; the second is the question of pension backloading; and the 
third is the spot versus contract views of the labor market. Chapter 2 
explains pension benefit accrual and illustrates age-pension-accrual 
profiles arising under typical pension plan provisions. The third chap 
ter first describes the BLS-LOB data. Next it uses the Retirement 
History Survey (RHS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) to 
calculate representative age-earnings profiles by age, sex, occupation, 
and industry. These age-earnings profiles are then used to study typi 
cal as well as unusual age-pension-accrual profiles among the uni 
verse of U.S. defined benefit plans. Chapter 4 uses the same data 
and procedures as chapter 3, but focuses on the pension costs of job 
mobility and differences by age, sex, industry and occupation in pen 
sion accrual. Chapter 5 begins with a presentation of the FIRM'S 
data. Next it describes the FIRM'S benefit formula in close detail. 
From the FIRM'S accrual profile it is clear that most of the FIRM'S 
employees have a very strong incentive to retire at the FIRM'S early 
retirement age, age 55. Chapter 6 examines the retirement response 
to the FIRM'S accrual profile. The final chapter summarizes the 
main findings of this study. 
The principal conclusions of this monograph are:
(1) The age-accrual profiles of typical pension plans exhibit 
sharp discontinuities at the ages of vesting, early retirement 
and normal retirement.
(2) In most firms with defined benefit plans, pension accrual 
gives workers a very substantial incentive to leave the firm 
after the age of early retirement and an even greater incen 
tive to leave after normal retirement age.
(3) The old age work disincentives of private pension plans typ 
ically are very large and exceed social security old age work 
disincentives.
(4) Government vesting and related legislation notwithstanding, 
sizeable pension backloading remains an important feature of 
a significant fraction of defined benefit plans.
(5) There is a very wide variation across pension plans in pension 
accrual profiles and, consequently, in retirement incentives.
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(6) For younger workers in some firms the expected loss in pen 
sion benefits due to job change is quite substantial.
(7) For middle age and older male and female workers earning 
the same nonpension wage, there is a roughly 10 percent 
male-female difference in pension benefit accrual assuming 
average male and female mortality probabilities.
(8) Analysis of the retirement behavior in the FIRM indicates a 
very significant retirement response to the pattern of pen 
sion accrual.
(9) Over 50 percent of 50-year-old employees of the FIRM leave 
before age 60, and 90 percent leave before age 65. The 
jumps in departure rates at specific ages coincide precisely 
with the discontinuities (kink points) in pension and social 
security accrual.
(10) The FIRM'S pension accrual increases the probability of 
workers age 55 leaving the FIRM before age 60 by approxi 
mately 30 percent, from 14 percent to 44 percent.
(11) The pattern of pension accrual with age is strongly at odds 
with a spot market view of the labor market.
The Trend Toward Early Retirement
The trend toward early retirement dates from the beginning of this 
century (Ransom and Sutch 1986). In 1900, the labor force partici 
pation rate of males 65 and older was 58.4 percent. By 1930, this 
rate had declined to 53.9 percent. The decline over the next 30 
years, beginning essentially at the inception of social security, was 
substantial; the 1960 participation rate of older men was 33.1 per 
cent. But an even bigger percentage decline has occurred since 1960; 
the most recent statistics record a 1986 labor force participation rate 
of older men of only 17.5 percent.
The trend toward early retirement has occurred despite an increase 
in life expectancy. The expected length of life for 20-year-olds at the 
turn of the century was roughly 45 years; the current figure is 50. At 
65, life expectancy is now 16.8 years; at the turn of the century it 
was only 11.9 years. The trend toward early retirement has also oc 
curred despite major increases in wage compensation; on average,
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annual real wage payments to workers have risen almost fourfold 
since 1900. A common explanation for the retirement trend is the 
increased demand for leisure associated with higher incomes. Like 
average annual real wage payments, real per capita income has in 
creased enormously since 1900. The current figure measured in con 
stant dollars is over four times the corresponding figure for 1900.
The acceleration in the rate of early retirement since 1960 appears 
to be due to factors other than increases in real income levels of the 
elderly, however. Many researchers have pointed to increases in so 
cial security benefits as a possible explanation (e.g., Hurd and 
Boskin 1984; Hausman and Wise 1985; Burtless 1986). Boskin 
(1977) stressed that social security's earnings test, which taxes back 
the social security benefits of workers whose earnings exceed rather 
small "exempt" amounts, may be an important cause of reduction in 
the labor force participation of older workers. Kotlikoff (1978) 
showed that many social security recipients adjust their labor supply 
to earn just under social security's exempt amounts.
Other researchers, particularly Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981), 
have cast doubt on the notion that social security induces early re 
tirement, at least prior to age 65. They pointed out that between ages 
62 (social security's early retirement age) and 65 (social security's 
normal retirement age) workers do not lose any social security ben 
efits in present expected value if they continue to work, because by 
foregoing benefits between 62 and 65, the age 65 benefit is actuari- 
ally increased. These researchers also pointed out that there are re- 
computation features of social security's benefit calculation that 
constitute implicit subsidies to labor supply prior to age 65. After 
age 65, however, social security benefits are typically not increased 
enough if retirement is postponed to compensate for the reduced 
number of years that they will be received.
One may question whether social security beneficiaries are aware 
of and correctly understand provisions such as actuarial increases 
and benefit recomputations. In addition, it may well be that many 
social security beneficiaries are liquidity-constrained, in which case 
they may well need to start collecting social security benefits prior 
to age 65, and, once they become social security recipients they fall
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under the earnings test. Hurd and Boskin (1984) stress liquidity con 
straints and social security's income effects as important factors in 
inducing early retirement. They use the Retirement History Survey 
(RHS) data and report that "any way the data were analyzed we 
found a positive association between retirement probabilities and so 
cial security wealth." They conclude that most of the substantial de 
cline in labor force participation of the young elderly that occurred 
between 1968 and 1973 can be traced to increases in social security 
benefits.
Blinder and Gordon (1980) and Burtless (1986) base their analyses 
of retirement behavior on the same data as Hurd and Boskin, but 
their conclusions about social security's impact on retirement differ. 
Blinder and Gordon find that "pension plans . . . provide powerful 
incentives to retire at the age of eligibility for the pension . . . (but) 
Social Security has a much weaker effect, if any, on retirement de 
cisions." Burtless states that "Social Security is found to have a pre 
cisely measured, but small overall effect on retirement." According 
to Burtless "rising Social Security benefits in the 1970s played only 
a small role in the decline in the average male retirement age." 
Hausman and Wise (1984) reach a similar conclusion in their analy 
sis of the RHS data. They report that social security has an impor 
tant effect on retirement, but that social security benefit increases in 
the early 1970s provide only a partial explanation for the reduced 
labor force participation over that period.
The study of Burtless and Moffitt (1984) is also based on the 
RHS, but it differs from Burtless (1986) in that it considers both 
retirement age and postretirement choice of hours of work. The con 
clusion from this analysis is also that social security has a statisti 
cally significant, but small effect on the age of retirement and that 
its effects operate through the level of social security benefits and 
the age at which benefits become available, rather than through so 
cial security's earnings test. Other analyses by Burkhauser and 
Quinn (1983); Fields and Mitchell (1984a, b); and Diamond and 
Hausman (1984) also report small social security effects.
Gustman and Steinmeier's (1983, 1985, 1986a, 1986b) analyses of 
retirement include the possibility of partial retirement at a reduced
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wage. Their studies, also based on the Retirement History Survey, 
suggest an important role of both social security and pensions in re 
tirement decisions; indeed in their (1983) paper they report that 
"... the combined effects of Social Security and pension benefits 
and mandatory retirement is to cause the percentage of individuals 
working full-time at age 66 to fall by 18.9 percentage points."
While increases in social security benefits and the work disincen 
tive from social security's earnings test may help explain reductions 
in labor force participation after age 62, these factors cannot explain 
increased retirement between ages 55 and 61. Since 1960, the labor 
force participation rate of males in this age range has declined sig 
nificantly. As demonstrated in this monograph, private pensions ap 
pear to be playing an important role in inducing retirement at these 
ages as well as at age 62 and beyond; the work disincentives at spe 
cific ages arising under many defined benefit pension plans are quite 
substantial; indeed, they are often larger than those arising from so 
cial security (even ignoring issues of actuarial increases and benefit 
recomputation).
Indeed the effect on retirement that has been attributed to social 
security may largely reflect a failure to control for private pension 
plan provisions. Like social security, most private pension plans pro 
vide a very large penalty for working after 65; but none of the stud 
ies summarized above were able to control for the precise provisions 
of private plans.
Despite the potential importance of private pensions in inducing 
early retirement, there have been very few studies relating retire 
ment to pension incentives. The reason is simply the limited avail 
able data detailing employee work histories together with the spe 
cific details of the employer's pension plan. There is an excellent 
Department of Labor data set detailing both work histories and 
pension plan provision for a representative sample of U.S. pension 
plans, but these data have not been made available to the public 
because of confidentiality concerns. Some limited analysis for the 
Department of Labor of these data by Gary Fields and Olivia 
Mitchell (1984a) indicates a significant retirement response to pen 
sion incentives.
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Pension Backloading
Prior to ERISA, companies often required as many as 25 years of 
service for pension vesting. To protect workers from being dis 
missed, falling ill, or leaving their employment for other reasons im 
mediately prior to becoming vested, ERISA mandated 100 percent 
vesting within 10 years of initial participation in a pension plan. The 
10-year vesting rule was reduced to 5 years in the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act.
The intent of the vesting provisions of ERISA and the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act was surely to limit the extent of backloading of vested 
pension accrual. While it is true that delaying vesting is a mecha 
nism for delaying the vested accrual of pension benefits, it is only 
one such mechanism. As this monograph makes clear, there are nu 
merous other pension plan provisions determining the age pattern of 
vested accrual. These include numerous basic benefit formulae, pro 
visions formulae determining supplemental benefits, rates of early 
retirement benefit reduction, and social security offset provisions. 
For a significant proportion of defined benefit pension plans, these 
and related features lead to very substantial backloading of accrued 
vested pension benefits. The FIRM'S pension plan discussed in chap 
ter 5 is a case in point. In this plan there is modest accrual of vested 
benefits prior to the plan's early retirement age and substantial pen 
sion accrual at the early retirement age. As a consequence, a worker 
who leaves the FIRM just prior to its early retirement age will re 
ceive a rather limited pension when compared to the pension of a 
worker who stays through the age of early retirement. The impact of 
these provisions is thus quite similar to those that would arise under 
a very long service requirement for vesting.
We are not suggesting that employers are deliberately designing 
defined benefit plans to circumvent the will of Congress; indeed, em 
ployers as well as workers may be unaware of the extent of back- 
loading of pension accrual. (In the case of our FIRM, the extent of 
backloading was a surprise to several of the plan administrators.) 
What we are suggesting is that such backloading of vested pension 
accrual appears contrary to the intent of the vesting legislation and 
merits careful study by Congress.
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Spot Versus Contract Theories of the Labor Market and 
the Use of Pension Accruals to Test these Theories
Under the spot market view of the labor market, the sum of an 
nual nonpension compensation and annual pension accrual should 
equal the worker's annual output. If the worker's annual output is, 
for example, constant independent of age, any increases (decreases) 
with age in pension accrual should be offset dollar for dollar by de 
creases (increases) at the corresponding ages in nonpension compen 
sation. While only one worker's output may change with age, it is 
unlikely to change precipitously from one age to another. In contrast, 
pension accrual can change dramatically with age, requiring offset 
ting dramatic changes in nonpension compensation according to the 
spot market view.
Understanding the extent of contractual arrangements between 
workers and firms is important for a host of economic issues ranging 
from the degree of wage flexibility over the business cycle to the 
availability of human capital insurance within the firm. Discriminat 
ing between "spot" and "long-term contract" views of the labor 
market is also critical for evaluating numerous questions specific to 
private pensions. One such question is whether workers and employ 
ers fully appreciate how complex pension plan provisions alter a 
firm's total compensation package. Evidence that labor markets 
closely accord with the predictions of a spot market would suggest 
rather small information problems. Equally productive workers, in 
this case, receive identical total annual remuneration regardless of 
their current employer or the specifics of the employer's pension 
plan.
A second question involves proper disclosure and valuation of a 
pension plan's net financial liabilities. In a spot market setting, an 
employer's net liability corresponds simply to the accrued value of 
vested pension benefits. Additional pension liabilities projected to 
arise from future employment, in such a setting, are matched dollar 
for dollar by future projected revenues associated with the worker's 
continued employment. The excess of projected over accrued liabil 
ities should not, therefore, affect a firm's valuation and suggests no 
case for estimating and disclosing projected pension liabilities. Un-
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der a long-term contract arrangement, on the other hand, revenue 
from continued employment need not match the accrual of future 
pension liabilities, plus the payment of wages, and the disclosure of 
projected rather than accrued liabilities is potentially more relevant 
for firm financial valuation.
A third question is the effect of pensions on labor mobility and 
hiring practices. In a spot market environment, the particular and 
quite peculiar rates of pension benefit accrual with age described in 
this monograph would have no consequences for labor mobility, 
since offsetting increases or reductions in direct wage compensation 
would leave the worker indifferent between staying on the current 
job or switching to another job offering an identical amount of total 
compensation. A spot market would also entail flexibility in wage 
compensation sufficient to permit hiring equally productive old and 
young, black and white, male and female workers, despite differ 
ences in their accrual of vested pension benefits reflecting age, race, 
and sex-specific mortality probabilities. Long-term contractual 
agreements, in contrast, may leave less flexibility to accommodate 
differences in individual circumstances.
Given knowledge of a worker's current and previous level of earn 
ings, and the benefit and retirement provisions of his pension plan, 
one could, in principle, directly test the spot market hypothesis by 
checking whether, in each year, the sum of the increment to a work 
er's accrued vested pension benefits plus his wage compensation 
equalled his marginal product. 1 Unfortunately, a worker's marginal 
product is unobservable and difficult to estimate. This data limita 
tion restricts, but, by no means precludes, inferences about spot ver 
sus contractual labor market arrangements.
As stated, the sum of the assumed age-earnings profile, measured 
in constant dollars, and the associated real pension accrual profile 
equals, under the spot market assumption, the age-marginal pro 
ductivity profile. Hypothetical age-marginal productivity profiles 
derived in this manner exhibit quite sharp or implausible discontinu 
ities at two critical ages, the age of full vesting, for plans with cliff 
vesting, and the early retirement age, for plans permitting early re 
tirement on better than actuarially fair terms. 2 Making reasonable
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assumptions concerning age-earnings profiles and interest rates, we 
find sizeable discontinuities (often as large as 40 percent) in hypo 
thetical age-marginal productivity profiles for a large fraction of 
firms with defined benefit plans. An alternative statement of these 
findings is that for smoothly shaped age-marginal product schedules, 
wage compensation must potentially fall or rise by roughly 40 per 
cent of the wage at critical ages to satisfy conditions of spot market 
equilibrium. These figures appear sufficiently large to rule out the 
hypothesis of annual spot clearing for a large segment of the U.S. 
labor market.
As Lazear's (1983) insightful study points out, the present ex 
pected value of accrued pension benefits represents a form of sever 
ance pay for workers who choose to separate from the firm. Such 
severance pay would naturally arise in contractual settings in which 
workers are paid (in wages) less than their marginal products. As the 
worker ages, the average value of this "severance pay" rises until 
the age of normal retirement, according to our findings. In a contrac 
tual setting, the implication of our finding of positive average pen 
sion accrual at all ages prior to normal retirement is that average real 
wages represent a lower bound for the average marginal product of 
workers covered by our sample of plans, up to the age of normal 
retirement. But after that age, accrual is typically negative, suggest 
ing that the wage exceeds marginal product at some age. It is impor 
tant to emphasize, however, that we find large deviations from the 
average, with large negative accruals after the age of early retire 
ment in many plans. And for other plans with positive pension ac 
cruals between early and normal retirement, the decline in pension 
accrual from a large positive number to a small positive number in 
this age interval is, itself, a significant retirement incentive.
Finally, an additional implication of these findings is that compen 
sating differential studies of the tradeoff between wages and pension 
benefits, if they are to be meaningful, cannot be based on cross- 
section evidence at a point of time. To understand the relation 
ship between compensation in the form of wages versus pension 
benefits, one must consider the receipt of both over a long period of 
employment.
Understanding Pension Benefit Accrual
Defining Pension Accrual
Consider a worker who is paid in two forms: salary and pension 
compensation. Pension compensation for working a year is the in 
crease in pension wealth during that year and is called pension ac 
crual. It is the difference between the present expected value of 
vested future benefits at the beginning and the end of the year. More 
formally, vested pension benefit accrual at age a, I(a), equals the 
difference between pension wealth at age a + 1, Pw(a+1), and pen 
sion wealth at age a, Pw(a), accumulated to age a + 1 at the nom 
inal interest rate r, i.e.:
(1) I(a) = Pw(a+l) - Pw(a)(l+r).
Pension wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested 
pension benefits discounted to age a. Intuitively, Pw(a) can be 
thought of as the worker's pension bank account. If I(a) equals zero, 
the worker continuing employment with the firm at age a has exactly 
the same pension wealth at age a+1 as an identically situated worker 
who terminates employment at age a. Pension accrual is thus the 
increment to pension wealth in excess of the return on the previously 
accumulated pension bank account.
The shape of pension accrual profiles, analogous to age-earnings 
profiles, can be understood by considering a stylized pension plan. 
The normal retirement age assumed for this stylized plan is 65. As 
sume, for the moment, that the plan has no early retirement option 
and that 100 percent vesting occurs in the 10th year of service. The 
retirement benefit of the stylized plan equals a constant X multiplied 
by the product of final year's earnings and service. There is no effect 
of receipt of social security benefits. Let B(a,t) denote the pension 
benefit available at the plan's normal retirement age to the worker
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who terminates employment with the plan sponsor at age a after 
t years of service. The relationship between B(a,t) and the worker's 
wage at age a, W(a), is simply:
(2) B(a,t) = XW(a)t.
If the worker continues to work for another year, the benefit at the 
end of the year is:
(3) B(a+ 1 ,t+1) = XW(a+ l)(t+ 1).
The difference in benefits between age a and age a+1, 
X[W(a+l)(t+l)   W(a)t], is depicted by the difference in the areas 
of the large rectangles in figure 2.1, except for the constant X. The 
greater the wage increase, the greater the increase in pension bene 
fits. Benefits would decrease if the wage declined enough. 3 Pension 
accrual is not simply the change in the benefit, however; rather it is
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the change in the present value of expected future benefits. The 
present value of benefits at age a is given by:
(4) Pw(a) = B(a,t)A(65)(l+rr (65 ~ a) 
= XW(a)tA(65)(l+r)- (65 ~ a) .
The term A(65) indicates the value at age 65 of a dollar of pension 
benefits received from age 65 until death. It represents an actuarial 
calculation that accounts for the likelihood that a person will be liv 
ing at each age in the future after age 65 and discounts the benefits 
at the rate of interest, r. The term (l+r)~ (65 ~ a) transforms the stock 
of pension wealth at age 65 to its present value, at age a. To keep the 
formula simple, we assume a zero probability of death prior to age 
65. The present value of pension wealth at age a+1 is
(5) Pw(a+l) = B(a+l,t-l-l)A(65)(H-r) ~ (65 ~ a " l)
The increment to pension wealth between a and a+ 1 , pension ac 
crual, is given by
(6) I(a) = Pw(a+l) - Pw(a)(l+r)
65 ~ a " n] [W(a+l)(t+0 - W(a)t]XA(65).
The term in the second set of brackets is simply the change in the 
pension benefit at 65 due to working an additional year; it is repre 
sented by the difference in the large rectangles in figure 2.1. Multi 
plying this term by XA(65), it gives the change in the value of 
pension wealth at age 65. The term in the first set of brackets is the 
discount factor that transforms the change to its present value, at age 
a. The present value of the change is represented by the difference in 
the small rectangles in figure 2.1. Notice that the accrual will be 
very small if age a is much less than 65, say 30. The present value 
declines exponentially with the difference between a and 65. At age 
64 the discount factor is 1, at 63 it is l/(l+r), at 62 it is l/(l+r)2 , 
etc. In other words, as the age at which benefits are available draws
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nearer, the accrual grows exponentially because of the discounting. 
In addition, pension accrual will be greater the greater the increase 
in wages. In the graphs that follow, pension accrual at age a is 
shown as a percent of the wage at that age. This ratio is denoted by 
R(a,t) and is defined by:
(7) R(a,t) = I(a)/W(a).
Under the provisions of this stylized plan, accrual as a proportion of 
the wage is shown by the line in figure 2.2 labeled "Retirement at 
65 Only," indicating that the plan has no early retirement option. 
The nominal wage growth incorporated in the age-earnings profile 
assumes moderate life cycle growth in real wages plus a 6 percent 
rate of inflation. A 3 percent real interest rate (9 percent nominal 
rate) is also assumed. 4 Accrual is zero before vesting. In the exam 
ple, vesting occurs after 10 years of service, at age 40. This cliff
FIGURE 2.2 - Pension increments as a percentage of salary, by 
age, for plans with an early retirement option versus retirement 
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vesting produces a spike in the accrual profile at this age. At age 41, 
the accrual is smaller because it equals only the difference in pension 
wealth at ages 40 and 41, whereas the accrual at 40 is total pension 
wealth accrued in the first 10 years of service (since accrued vested 
pension wealth at age 39 is zero). In subsequent years, accrual grows 
exponentially as age approaches 65, as long as wage growth is suf 
ficiently large, as described above. These provisions create an incen 
tive to stay with the firm until age 65, since pension accrual is 
increasing. This attribute of the standard defined benefit plan is 
called backloading.
Unlike the plan described thus far, most defined benefit plans have 
early retirement provisions. Such provisions typically have a dra 
matic effect on the pension accrual profile. The accrual under the 
stylized plan, but with an actuarially unfair early retirement option 
at age 55, is shown in the profile labeled "Early Retirement Op 
tion" in figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 repeats figure 2.2 but under the as-
FIGURE 2.3 - Pension increments as a percentage of salary, by 
age, for plans with an early retirement option versus retirement 
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sumptions of a 10 percent interest rate and no growth in wages by 
age. For the profile with the early retirement option, accrual rates 
after age 55 are substantially negative, approaching  15 percent of 
salary at age 65. With no early retirement option, on the other hand, 
accrual rates are always positive. We now discuss without the use of 
explicit formulae why the early retirement option can alter the shape 
of age-pension-accrual profiles. The formulae are presented in ap 
pendix I.
The important feature of the typical early retirement option is that 
the early retirement benefit reduction is less than actuarially fair. 
That is, benefits are not reduced enough to offset the fact that they 
will be received for more years. The present value of pension wealth, 
if receipt of benefits begins at 55, is larger than if receipt begins at 
any later age. Thus at any age younger than 55, the pension wealth 
that the worker is entitled to, were he to leave the firm at age a, is 
the present value of benefits if their receipt begins at 55. The calcu 
lation that gives the present value at age a of benefits available at 
age 55, instead of at 65, yields an accrual profile that increases ex 
ponentially to age 55, instead of 65. Were the early retirement re 
duction actuarially fair, the profile would look just like the one with 
no early retirement. The present value of pension wealth would be 
independent of the age between 55 and 65 that benefits were first 
received. Thus the "retirement at 65 only" profile could also be 
labeled "actuarially fair accrual rates," since, by definition, an ac 
tuarially fair early retirement reduction formula produces an accrual 
profile that is independent of the age at which benefits are first 
received.
With early retirement with less than actuarial reduction, accrual 
declines after age 55. The are three reasons for this: (1) Prior to age 
55 an increment in pension benefits has a higher present value as the 
age, 55, at which they can be received draws nearer. After 55, ben 
efits are available immediately. Unlike benefits prior to age 55, ben 
efits at 56, for example, are not discounted relative to those at 57 
because the worker doesn't have to wait a year longer to receive 
them. This reduces accrual compared to the accrual just before age 
55. (2) Before age 55 the present value of benefits at age a and at
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age a+1, conditional on reaching the age of early retirement, are 
both based on the receipt of benefits from age 55 until death. After 
55, however, if retirement is postponed the number of years that ben 
efits will be received declines, tending to lower their present value. 
(3) After early retirement, the smaller the reduction factor the closer 
pension wealth at age a will be to wealth at age a+1, reducing the 
accrual between a and a+1. The lower the reduction factor, the 
lower the accrual. The reduction factors for many plans are quite 
small. If there were no reduction, the benefit at age a would be the 
same as at age a+1, and the present value of benefits starting at 
a+1 would tend to be lower than at age a because they would be 
received for one year less. Accrual before the early retirement age is 
not affected by the early retirement reduction factor. Before the early 
retirement age, the higher the discount rate r, the greater the in 
crease in the accrual rate as age approaches 55. After 55, the lower 
the early retirement reduction factor, the greater the decline in ac 
crual with age. In summary, remaining with the firm after the early 
retirement age means foregoing the option of accepting benefits on 
advantageous terms. In addition to the three factors just mentioned, 
the pension accrual is of course affected by the increase (or de 
crease) in the wage.
As subsequent exposition will show, at least until the 1986 Age 
Discrimination Act, accrual typically declined sharply at age 65, and 
was usually negative thereafter, whether or not the plan had an early 
retirement option. The Age Discrimination Act, which postdates the 
plans described in this monograph, requires the continued crediting 
of service for workers beyond the age of normal retirement. This law 
lessens, somewhat, the sharp drop in pension accrual after normal 
retirement.
While the preceding description is suggestive of the general shape 
of accrual rate profiles, there are few earnings-based plans with fea 
tures as simple as the early retirement option plan considered here. 
In addition to more complicated rules for plan participation and vest 
ing that often involve age as well as service requirements, there are 
a variety of methods of computing earnings bases, including career 
averages, and averages of earnings, possibly highest earnings, over a
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specified period or number of years. Reduction rates for early retire 
ment are often a specified function of age as well as length of ser 
vice. Some plans allow no further accrual after a given number of 
years of service.
Roughly 30 percent of defined benefit participants belong to plans 
that are integrated with social security. There are two, not necessar 
ily independent, important forms of "integration." One involves a 
"step rate" benefit formula that uses a different value for the per 
centage of the product of earnings times service for levels of earn 
ings below and levels above specified values. The second is referred 
to as an "offset" formula which reduces pension benefits by some 
fraction of the participant's basic social security benefit. Many of 
the offset plans set ceilings on the extent of the offset. A minority of 
plans, in particular, those with social security offset formulae, pro 
vide supplemental benefits for early retirees prior to their receipt of 
social security benefits.
The supplemental benefit formulae can also be quite involved, in 
corporating both the participant's age and service in the calculation. 
There are also plans that use one benefit formula to compute early 
retirement benefits and a different formula to determine normal re 
tirement benefits. In addition to these earnings-related plans, a sig 
nificant number of plans covering over 40 percent of defined benefit 
participants calculate benefits independent of the participant's earn 
ings history (Kotlikoff and Smith 1983, table 4.5.1). These formulae 
can also be quite complex. There are other plans that are earnings- 
related, but provide differing flat benefit amounts based on the par 
ticipant's earnings level. Finally, there are plans that specify 
minimum and maximum benefit levels. Each of these additional fea 
tures can significantly alter the profile of accrual rates by age, espe 
cially the extent of discontinuities in the profile. Our analysis of 
pension plans in this monograph takes account of a great number of 
those complexities.
The assumption of constant nominal interest rates implies a quite 
different pattern of pension accrual than would occur with variable 
interest rates. Changes in long term nominal interest rates produce 
capital gains and losses on previously accumulated pension wealth
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that do not directly affect pension accrual. A time path of varying 
interest rates around a constant mean would produce a much more 
discontinuous age-pension accrual profile than those in figures 2.1 
and 2.2 and in other diagrams in this monograph.
Additional Features of Accrual Profiles and Sensitivity to Wage 
Inflation and Interest Rates
The Interest Rate
Figure 2.4 depicts three accrual rate profiles for a worker who 
begins participating at age 30 in a defined benefit plan like that de 
scribed above. The plan calculates normal retirement benefits as 1 
percent of average earnings over the last five years of service times 
years of service. Benefits are reduced by 3 percent for each year that 
early retirement precedes normal retirement. Cliff vesting occurs af 
ter 10 years. The early and normal retirement ages are 55 and 65
FIGURE 2.4 - Pension increments as a percentage of salary, 
by age, for a wage stream with 6% inflation discounted at real 







3% Real / 9% Nominal 
Interest Rates 6% Real 712% Nominal 
Interest Rates
9% Real /15% Nominal 
Interest Rates
35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65
Age
22 Understanding Pension Benefit Accrual
respectively. Nominal wage growth is determined by two factors, a 
cross-sectional profile of "merit" increases by age and an assumed 
economy wide rate of wage inflation. The merit profile involves ap 
proximately a 50 percent growth in real wages between ages 30 and 
50 and very little growth from 50 to 65. The rate of wage inflation 
incorporates both across-the-board increases in labor productivity 
and the price level.
As in the comparison of figures 2.2 and 2.3 above, figure 2.4 
shows the sensitivity of the profiles to the real interest rate, the rate 
at which future benefits are discounted. The top profile incorporates 
a 6 percent rate of inflation and a 9 percent nominal (3 percent real) 
interest rate. The bottom profile incorporates 6 percent nominal 
wage growth, but a 15 percent nominal interest rate. The intermedi 
ate profile in figure 2.4 is based on 6 percent wage growth and a 12 
percent nominal interest rate. It yields increments at 65 that are ap 
proximately zero. These figures demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, 
higher nominal interest rates, whether due to higher real rates or 
higher inflation premia, produce lower rates of pension accrual. 
While real interest rates as high as 10 percent are well above historic 
after-tax real returns, they seem plausible as risk adjusted rates that 
would be used by potentially liquidity-constrained workers. The fig 
ures also indicate that under these plan provisions a considerable gap 
between nominal interest rates and wage growth rates is needed to 
produce negative accrual rates before age 65.
Inflation
The three profiles in figure 2.5 differ both in their assumed rates 
of wage inflation and nominal interest, but incorporate the same 3 
percent real interest rate. The 2 percent wage inflation profile dis 
counts pension benefits at a 5 percent nominal rate, while the 6 and 
10 percent wage inflation profiles are based on 9 and 13 percent 
nominal interest rates, respectively.
The major effect of the assumptions about wage growth and nom 
inal interest rates is on the "vesting spike." These assumptions pro 
duce vesting spikes ranging from 5 to 37 percent of wages at age 40. 
The intermediate wage and interest rate assumption produces a 14 
percent spike at cliff vesting.
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FIGURE 2.5 - Pension increments as a percentage of salary, 
by age, for wage inflation of 2%, 6% and 10%. Benefits dis 
counted at a 3% real interest rate.
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Age of Joining the Plan
Accrual rate profiles for workers joining the pension plan at ages 
30, 40, and 50 are presented in figure 2.6, based on the intermediate 
wage and interest rate assumptions of figure 2.4. The vesting spikes 
for the three profiles are 14, 36, and 66 percent of the corresponding 
wage at ages 40, 50, and 60. While vesting at these latter ages is 
much less common than prior to age 40, Kotlikoff and Smith (1983, 
table 3.6.5) report that over a quarter of current defined benefit pen 
sion recipients retired with 20 or fewer years of service.
Job Change
Figure 2.6 is constructed under the assumption that the workers of 
the same age receive identical wage compensation. Thus the diagram 
also indicates the potential loss in accrued pension benefits for work 
ers who switch jobs, but receive the same wage compensation in the 
new job and are covered by the same pension plan.
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FIGURE 2.6 - Pension increments as a percentage of salary, 
by age, for an employee beginning work at 31,41 and 51. 
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Figure 2.7 illustrates the cost of job change with no early retire 
ment option. It should be compared with figure 2.6. The loss is sub 
stantially greater without the early retirement option. The plans 
represented in the two diagrams are the same except that in figure 
2.7 the early retirement reduction schedule is assumed to be actuar- 
ially fair (equivalently, there is no early retirement option). Again, 
the top line of this graph shows the accrual rate under our plan for a 
person who starts work at age 30 (with 6 percent wage inflation and 
a 3 percent real interest rate). A person with one job change would 
accumulate benefits up to age 41 according to the top curve, but 
then would accumulate benefits according to the curve labelled "age 
41." Note that no benefits would be accumulated for the first 10 
years. The difference in accumulated pension benefits at age 65 re 
flects the difference in the areas under the two accrual paths. This 
difference could be very substantial and depends, of course, both on 
when job changes occur and how frequently they occur.
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FIGURE 2.7 - Pension increments as a percentage of salary, 
by age, for an employee beginning work at 31,41 and 51, with 
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It is also important to note that the loss in accrued benefits from 
job change in this example is not due solely to vesting; in figure 2.7, 
accrual in years after vesting occurs is larger for a worker remaining 
on the same job for 35 years than for a worker who changes jobs 
(literally pension plans). This lower accrual beyond vesting for later 
plan entrants results from the interaction of service and wage growth 
in earnings-based defined benefit pension formulae. To see the na 
ture of this interaction, consider a plan with immediate vesting that 
pays 2 percent of final year's salary times years of service. For a 
worker experiencing positive wage growth who is employed for, say, 
30 years and retires at 60, the pension benefit is 2 percent of the age 
60 salary times 30. If this same worker experiencing the same wage 
growth were to change jobs each year, joining an identical plan, his 
benefit would equal 2 percent times the sum of the 30 annual sala 
ries. Assuming positive wage growth, the pension benefit of the 
former worker which is based on the age 60 salary will exceed that
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of the latter worker whose benefit is primarily based on the lower 
earnings received in earlier years of his career. In effect, defined 
benefit plans that base benefits on end-of-career earnings, index ben 
efits to the wage.
Summary
Pension accrual refers to the annual compensation paid to a 
worker through a firm's pension plan. Pension accrual is defined as 
the addition to the worker's pension wealth that is above and beyond 
interest earned on previously accumulated pension wealth. Various 
defined benefit pension provisions, including basic and supplemental 
benefit formulae, ages of early and normal retirement, and early re 
tirement reduction factors, are important factors influencing pension 
accrual.
The profile of pension accrual is particularly sensitive to early re 
tirement provisions. Less than actuarial reduction of early retirement 
benefits or the provision of supplemental benefits to those who take 
early retirement can lead to accrual profiles that increase sharply at 
the age of early retirement. In such plans there is potentially a very 
large incentive to remain with the firm through the age of early re 
tirement. After the age of early retirement and certainly after the age 
of normal retirement, pension accrual may be very small if not neg 
ative and may, therefore, induce workers to retire. This is the notion 
of the wage carrot and the pension stick. The wage provides a gen 
eral incentive to remain with the firm, but the pension plan after a 
certain point in time may greatly penalize workers who fail to retire.
In addition to depending on the particular plan provisions, the 
shapes and levels of accrual profiles are quite sensitive to the as 
sumed rates of interest, wage growth, and inflation. In the illustra 
tions of this chapter, variations in these assumptions produced 
accrual spikes at vesting ranging from 5 percent to 37 percent of 
wages. The accrual profiles also depend on the age at which the 
worker begins participating in the pension plan. For workers who 
begin participating late in life, the pension spike at vesting can be as 
large as two-thirds of the wage.
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Another way to make the point that defined benefit plans give 
workers incentives to remain with the plan sponsor, at least through 
early retirement, is to demonstrate the possible loss in pension ben 
efits suffered by workers who change jobs. Again, depending on the 
plan's precise provisions, the choice of economic assumptions, and 
the pension on the job to which a worker moves, pensions may impose 
considerable costs to job mobility for workers of certain ages and 
with certain amounts of service. For other workers, such as those 
who are eligible for early retirement, the pension cost of job change 
may be negative, and pensions may induce more job mobility.

3 
Pension Accrual in the BLS-LOB Data
In this chapter we examine accrual ratios for earnings-based and 
flat benefit (nonearnings-based) defined benefit plans from the BLS- 
LOB survey. The chapter begins with a brief description of the 
BLS-LOB data. The next section describes the creation of wage pro 
files used to form pension accrual profiles. Earnings-based plans are 
considered in the third section, while the final section examines flat 
benefit plans. Variation in pension accrual profiles due to differences 
in retirement ages is the topic of the third section, followed by a 
discussion of the wide variation among plans for given combinations 
of early and normal retirement ages. Next, the effect of social secu 
rity offset provisions are considered, and then the effects of alterna 
tive postnormal-retirement provisions are examined. These analyses 
are followed by a consideration of the effects on accrual profiles of 
early and normal retirement supplements.
The BLS-LOB Data
The BLS-LOB (1979) establishments constitute a subsample of the 
1979 National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical and 
Clerical Pay. Based on the file's population weights, this subsample 
covers 17,965,282 private pension plan participants in the U.S., 
which is slightly over half of all 1979 private pension participants. 
The subsample's universe consists of all firms with over 100 employ 
ees with the exception of mining, construction and retail trade estab 
lishments where the minimum firm size was 250 employees and 
service establishments where the minimum firm size was 50 employ 
ees. The BLS-LOB survey contains 3,248 plans, of which the BLS 
labeled 2,492 as "usable." Our master sample consists of 2,343 of 
these 2,492 plans. This study focuses on 1,183 plans that determine 
benefits based on past earnings and that specify cliff vesting at 10 
years of service.
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Sampled establishments were requested to report work schedules 
and information about 11 different types of fringe benefits. This in 
formation was provided for each of three occupational groups: man 
agers, sales workers, and office workers. The BLS-LOB (1979) 
pension benefits tape consists of establishment records for each oc 
cupational group that detail features of pension benefit plans cover 
ing the particular occupational group in question. Unfortunately, 
firm identifiers are intentionally excluded from the computer record; 
hence, it is impossible to reconstruct the actual pension characteris 
tics of the initial establishment. The data can, however, be used to 
estimate industrywide or occupationwide values of pension variables.
The BLS-LOB data provide great detail concerning pension plan 
provisions. In computing the pension-accrued profiles discussed in 
this and the following chapter, we went to considerable pains to pro 
gram each of the key pension provisions influencing pension accrual. 
In many cases this required writing numerous elaborate subroutines 
that were applicable to only a few of the pension plans.
Wage Profiles Used to Examine Pension Accrual in the 
BLS-LOB Plans
To calculate average pension benefit increments by industry- 
occupation group for a given length of employment we need estimates 
of age-wage profiles for each group. It is particularly important that 
assumptions about the wage profiles of older workers be as realistic 
as possible. It is clear from the discussion in chapter 2 that wage 
growth has an important effect on pension accrual. Wage growth af 
fects compensation for future work directly, and indirectly, through 
its effect on pension accrual. Without lengthy longitudinal records on 
individuals, we have no completely satisfactory way of estimating age- 
wage profiles. The Retirement History Survey (RHS), however, does 
provide some longitudinal data for older workers. 5 We first discuss 
evidence from these data and then present estimated age-wage pro 
files based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. For older 
workers, the two sources of data provide roughly consistent evidence.
The age-wage profiles appropriate for determining pension accrual 
are clearly those pertaining to workers staying in the same firm, thus
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tenure as well as age should be included in the analysis of earnings 
by age. Our accrual profiles also assume full-time employment. 
Hence, wage rates per unit of time is the appropriate earnings con 
cept for our purposes. While conventionally computed age-earnings 
profiles sometimes show a downward trend for older workers, this 
appears due, in part, to a reduction in hours worked and, in part, to 
the mix of full-time and part-time workers in the sample.
Evidence from the Retirement History Survey
The RHS data is based on a sample of persons who were first 
surveyed in 1969 when they were between 58 and 63. These respon 
dents were resurveyed every two years until 1979. Table 3.1 shows 
the means of hourly wages by age and year for persons who reported 
an hourly wage rate and who were not partially or fully retired in a 
given year. For a given calendar year, these data in general show 
little decline in wage rates at least through age 63 or 64. The num 
ber of observations per cell is fairly small since the cells only in 
clude older individuals who are still working. Possibly those whose 
wage rates would have fallen from one year to the next are less 
likely to be in the sample. Analogous calculations showing the me 
dian of annual salaries of persons who reported weekly, monthly, or 
annual salaries, are presented in table 3.2. Here again, in the cross- 
section, there are relatively constant real salary levels through age 
64 among persons who are not retired, although there seems to be 
some decline on average.
The accrual calculations require, however, nominal wage profiles. 
From both tables 3.1 and 3.2, it is clear that nominal wages of older 
workers increased rather rapidly over this period. A more precise 
indication of nominal increases is shown in table 3.3 for all persons 
who reported weekly, monthly, or annual salaries. The entry corre 
sponding to age 58-60 and the year 1969-71 is the median salary 
increase between 1969 and 1971 for all persons who were 58 in 1969 
and who reported salary figures in both 1969 and 1971. The other 
entries are calculated in an analogous manner. The table shows sub 
stantial nominal increases over this period, on the order of 6 percent 
per year on average. (The entries pertain to a two-year interval.)
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Table 3.1
Means of Hourly Wages for Nonself-Employed Males, 


































































































































Source: Retirement History Survey. Excludes people who say they are partially or fully retired. 
The number of observations used to calculate the associated value is recorded in parenthesis
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Table 3.2
Medians of Annual Salary for Nonself-Employed Males, 


































































































































Source. Retirement History Survey Excludes people who say they are partially or fully retired. 
The number of observations used to calculate the associated value is recorded in parenthesis
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Table 3.3
Median Percent Changes in Annual Salary for Nonself-Employed Males,














































































































Source' Retirement History Survey. Excluded people who say they are partially or fully retired 
The number of observations used to calculate the associated value is recorded in parenthesis.
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Considering the average increments by age in the last column, there 
is some evidence that the increases declined somewhat with age. At 
least through 1977 after which our sample sizes are very small it 
appears that salary increases for these older workers were, in gen 
eral, keeping up with price increases. The percent increases in the 












In short, these data suggest substantial nominal wage increases for 
older workers, roughly consistent, on average, with overall inflation 
levels.
Wage-Tenure Profiles from the Current Population Survey 
To estimate wage-tenure profiles by industry and occupation 
group, we matched the May 1979 Supplement to the CPS March 
1979 CPS. The May Supplement provides tenure data, while the 
wage data come from the March tape. We were able to obtain the 
required wage, age, and tenure information for somewhat over 
15,000 persons in the 24 industry-occupation groups distinguished in 
the BLS-LOB survey. Relevant cell sample sizes, however, were 
large enough to obtain "reasonable" estimates for only 16 groups, 
noted below.
After considerable experimentation with two-way tables showing 
average salary by age and tenure, we elected simply to obtain least- 
squares estimates of wage rates using the specification
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(8) W = ao + a,A + a2A2 + b,T + b2T2 + cAT ,
where W is the wage rate, A is age, and T is tenure. To estimate 
wage levels by age for a person who entered a firm at, for example, 
age 30, we calculated
(9) W = a,A + a2A 2 + B,(A-30) + B2(A-30)2 + c(A)(A-30) ,
for values of A between 30 and 65.
The estimated profiles for the total group, and by occupation over 
all industry groups, are presented in figure 3.1. These profiles are 
empirical counterparts of the "merit" scale used in the illustrative 
calculations in chapter 1.
The cross-sectional age-earnings profile (9) for all groups com 
bined increases by about 50 percent between age 30 and age 52 when 
it reaches its maximum. Then it declines by about 10 percent over
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the next 13 years, or about .8 percent per year on average. Assuming 
a wage inflation rate of 6 percent, therefore, produces a nominal 
wage rate for older workers increasing at about 5 percent per year. 
For older workers this path of nominal wage growth seems to be in 
rough accord with the evidence from the Retirement History Survey. 
In the calculations of this and the following chapter we assume a 6 
percent nominal wage growth through age 65, after which nominal 
wage growth is assessed to be zero.
In addition to the graphs of the cross-section wage profiles, sum 
mary indicators of their shapes are provided in table 3.4. It shows 
salary at age 30, maximum salary, the age of maximum salary, and 
salary at age 65, together with average percent increases between the 
end points and the maximum.
The Decline in Pension Wealth Accrual at Early and 
Normal Retirement Ages
This section and the following four sections consider earnings- 
based plans. Earnings-based plans account for approximately 80 per 
cent of the BLS-designated usable plans from the survey and about 
65 percent of plans weighted by pension coverage. Each of the 
earnings-based plans we examine stipulates cliff vesting at 10 years, 
but the plans have different normal and early retirement ages. Other 
earnings-based plans with different vesting ages have accrual profiles 
similar to those we shall describe, but for convenience of exposition 
we have not included them in this analysis. Of the 1,183 earnings- 
based plans with 10-year cliff vesting, 508 are integrated with social 
security under an offset formula. 6
Average accrual profiles (pension accrual as a ratio of the wage) 
for the percent of earnings plans with 10-year cliff vesting are shown 
in appendix table 1 by early and normal retirement ages. These ac 
crual profiles as well as all other accrual profiles discussed in this 
chapter and the next incorporate a 9 percent nominal interest rate 
assumption. In forming average accrual profiles, we used the BLS- 
LOB survey weights; i.e., the average age-accrual profiles on 
weighted averages of accrual rates at each age. Three of these aver 
age profiles, corresponding to plans with the respective early and
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Table 3.4
Summary Statistics on Wage Profiles by 





























































































































































Source: Current Population Survey (May 1979)
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FIGURE 3.2 - Weighted average accrual rates for percent of 
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Note: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
normal retirement ages 55-55, 55-65, 65-65 are graphed in fig 
ure 3.2. The graphs show very substantial declines in the rate of 
pension wealth accrual at several critical ages. The first is the age of 
normal retirement, which equals the age of early retirement for plans 
with no early retirement option. The postnormal retirement decline 
in the average rate of accrual primarily reflects (1) the lack of an 
actuarial or even a nonactuarial increase in benefits in most plans for 
workers who delay receipt of benefits after normal retirement, and 
(2) the pre-1986 failure of many plans to credit postnormal retire 
ment service. As mentioned, this second reason for the decline in 
accrual at normal retirement will be affected by the 1986 Age Dis 
crimination Act that mandates continued participation in the pension 
benefit formula after the age of normal retirement. A subsection be 
low considers in more detail how credit for postnormal retirement 
service affects postnormal retirement accrual.
40 Pension Accrual in the BLS-LOB Data
The second sharp decline in the rate of accrual occurs at the age 
of early retirement, but this decline is substantially lower than the 
decline at the normal retirement age. 7 The third substantial decline 
occurs between ages 65 and 66, no matter what the ages of early and 
normal retirement.
The declines in average accrual rates at these critical ages indi 
cated in appendix table 1, are highlighted in table 3.5. The ages of 
early and normal retirement are identical in the table. Columns 1, 4, 
6, and 8 consider respective retirement ages of 55, 60, 62, and 65. 
At these ages the accrual rate as a percent of wages declines from 
.26 to 0, .27 to -.06, .25 to -.13, and .21 to -.19 respectively. 
Thus, at these ages total annual compensation (wage plus pension 
accrual) from working declines by 21 percent, 26 percent, 30 per 
cent, and 33 percent respectively. Surely the incentive to continue 
work with the current employer beyond these ages is very substan 
tially reduced.
In instances where early and normal retirement ages do not coin 
cide, there is also a very substantial decline in the average ratio of 
pension accrual to the wage at the age of normal retirement. For 
example, among plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retire 
ment at 60, the average decline is from .14 to  .09. There is also a 
decline at the age of early retirement for these plans, although it is 
considerably less than the decline at the age of normal retirement. 
For example, of plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retire 
ment at 65, the average decline at 55 is from .10 to .07, while at 65 
the average decline is from .04 to  .15.
Finally, consider the substantial decline in the rate of pension ac 
crual between ages 65 and 66. The effective reduction in compensa 
tion ranges from 8 percent to 40 percent of the wage rate except for 
plans with early and normal retirement at 60, in which case the de 
cline is from  .12 to  .14. Thus, while the stipulations of plans 
vary tremendously, on average they seem to provide a substantial 
inducement to retirement after age 65, no matter what the induce 
ment before this age.
Figure 3.2 and table 3.5 also show a large variation in average 
pension accrual at 40, the age of cliff vesting. It is highest, on av-
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Tfcble 3.5
Weighted Average Accrual Rates at Selected Ages
for Percent Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting,
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Source' Appendix table 1
erage, for plans with early and normal retirement at 55 and lowest, 
on average, for plans with early and normal retirement at 65. As 
mentioned, because the early retirement reduction is typically less 
than actuarially fair, pension wealth is generally greatest if benefits 
are taken at the age of early retirement. Thus the accrued wealth at 
the age of vesting is usually calculated by discounting benefits from
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the age of early retirement, assuming that the worker could begin to 
collect benefits at that age. Figure 3.2, for example, shows a vesting 
spike of almost 25 percent of earnings for 55-55 plans, 7 percent of 
earnings for 55-65 plans, and about 4 percent of earnings for 65-65 
plans.
In summary, continuation in the labor force after the age of nor 
mal retirement, and sometimes early retirement, typically involves a 
substantial reduction in compensation because of the very large de 
clines in the rate of pension wealth accrual. After the age of 65, 
there is, on average, a substantial loss in pension accrual, no matter 
what the ages of early and normal retirement. And the sharp changes 
in average pension accrual at particular ages provide rather strong 
prima facie evidence against annual spot market clearing; neither 
wages nor marginal products appear to adjust at these critical ages to 
meet the spot market equilibrium condition.
Variation Among Plans
Even among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages 
there is wide variation in accrual rates at each age, particularly after 
the age of early retirement. To demonstrate this fact, average accrual 
rates for the 513 plans of appendix table 1 with early retirement at 
55 and normal retirement at 65, together with median, maximum, 
minimum and upper and lower 5 percentile levels, are shown in ap 
pendix table 2. The lower 5 percentile points for any age group is 
that accrual rate such that 5 percent of plans have accruals below 
that level. The upper 5 percentile point is defined analogously.
Consider the accrual ratio at vesting. While the average vesting 
ratio for this sample is .071, the median is .021, the maximum is 
.383, and the minimum is 0. The ratio at the lowest 5th percentile is 
0, while it is .201 for the highest 5th percentile. A similarly large 
dispersion in annual accrual ratios is indicated at each of the ages 40 
through 70. Weighted average accrual rates together with upper and 
lower 5 percentile levels are graphed in figure 3.3. While the aver 
age accrual rates between ages 55 and 65 are positive, for many 
plans the rates prior to age 65 are negative and sizeable. Thus it is 
very important not to base judgments about the labor force partici-
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FIGURE 3.3 - Weighted average accrual rates and upper and 
lower levels for percent of earnings plans with 10-year cliff 
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Note: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
pation incentive effects of pensions simply on the basis of average 
accrual rates.
Additional evidence of the variability of pension accrual profiles 
is obtained by comparing profiles of particular plans. Figure 3.4 
plots the accrual profiles of 4 of the sample's 30 largest plans. Plan 
1 exhibits a 29 percent vesting spike, a reduction of 30 percent 
age points in the accrual ratio at age 55 and a further major reduc 
tion at age 65 from -.063 to -.351. In contrast the vesting spike 
is only 4 percent for plan 2 in the figure. This plan also exhibits 
no major reduction in the accrual ratio at early retirement and only 
a minor reduction at normal retirement. Plan 3's vesting spike is 
much less than that of plan 1, but the drop off of the accrual ratio 
at age 55 is very much larger than that in plan 1. This plan also 
exhibits extremely sharp changes in accrual ratios at ages 60, and 
63. Plan 4 exhibits even greater discontinuities in the accrual profile.
44 Pension Accrual in the BLS-LOB Data







-50 i i i i i i
34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Age
Thus the plans' incentive effects on labor force participation also 
vary widely.
The Effect of Social Security Offsets
As described above, a substantial number of plans have social 
security offset provisions, under which pension benefits are reduced 
by an amount depending upon the recipients' social security bene 
fits. The offset provisions vary widely among plans. In some in 
stances the offset is enough to completely eliminate payment of 
pension benefits from the private pension plan. Typically, private 
pension benefit payments are substantially lower with than without 
the offset provision.
Accrual rates for percent of earning plans with 10-year cliff vest 
ing and early retirement at 55 are shown in appendix table 3 for 
selected normal retirement ages, with and without social security
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FIGURE 3.5 - Weighted average accrual rates for percent of 
earnings plans with 10-year cliff vesting, early retirement at 55 
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Note: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
offset provisions. The average profiles for offset and nonoffset plans 
with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 62 are graphed 
in figure 3.5. A noticeable difference between the two groups of 
plans is the relatively large spike at vesting for plans without the 
offset compared with the low rate of accrual at vesting for plans with 
the social security offset. In addition, the accrual ratio at 55 is larger 
for plans without the offset than for plans with it, and the drop in the 
rate of accrual is substantially larger for plans without than for plans 
with the offset. The accrual ratio for plans without an offset is .21 at 
55 and drops by almost 60 percent to .09 at 56. In contrast the ac 
crual rate for plans with an offset is about 16 percent at 55 and drops 
by only about 26 percent to .12 at age 56.
Both groups of plans show negative accrual rates after the age of 
normal retirement, 62, and both groups of plans show much larger
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negative accrual rates after 65. Appendix table 3 indicates that the 
relative accrual rates of the two groups of plans with different nor 
mal retirement ages are similar to those shown in the figure.
The table also shows that pension accrual at the age of vesting is 
rather substantial for plans without a social security offset even 
among plans with normal retirement at 65. The average accrual rate 
at vesting for all plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retire 
ment at 65 is .071, as shown in appendix table 1. As indicated in ap 
pendix table 3 accrual is over 12 percent for plans without a social 
security offset, while it is less than 2 percent for plans with an offset.
Postnormal-Retirement Provisions and Pension Accrual
Accrual ratios for percent of earnings plans with early retirement 
at 55 are shown in table 3.6 for selected normal retirement ages and 
for alternative postnormal retirement provisions. The postnormal re 
tirement provisions have been grouped into five categories:
(1) Full Credit, Deferred: plans providing full credit according to 
the standard formula for years worked past the age of normal 
retirement, but with benefits beginning only after retirement.
(2) No Credit, Deferred: plans with no credit given for work after 
the age of normal retirement and with benefits beginning only 
after retirement.
(3) No Credit, Immediate Payout or Actuarial Increase: plans with 
no credit given for additional work after the age of normal 
retirement, but with benefits beginning immediately or in 
creased actuarially until benefits are taken.
(4) Limited Credit, Deferred: plans with limited credit given for 
work after the age of normal retirement or with full credit for 
service postnormal retirement up to a specified age or number 
of years; benefits are deferred in these plans until retirement.
(5) Limited Credit, Immediate Payout or Actuarial Increase: plans 
with provisions analogous to the third category above, but 
with limited credit rather than no credit.
With the exception of type (3) plans, these provisions typically lead 
to very negative accrual ratios after the age of normal retirement. 
Appendix table 4 compares accrual ratios across these 5 types of
Table 3.6
Weighted Average Accrual Rates at Critical Ages for Percent of Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting 
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Full No No credit, Limited Limited 
credit, credit, Immed. credit, credit, 
Defer. Defer, payout or Defer. Immed. 
Actuarial payout or 
increase Actuarial 
increase
76 7 2 66 35
191 190 250 170 161
119 137 091 058 094 
.082 216 -091 094 .066
-064 -378 0 -033 -051
65
Full No No credit, Limited Limited 
credit, credit, Immed. credit, credit, 
Defer. Defer, payout or Defer. Immed. 
Actuarial payout or 
increase Actuarial 
increase
212 207 63 22 9
105 081 077 112 116
071 051 .062 097 112
.027 041 080 041 037
Source Appendix table 7
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plans with varying postnormal retirement benefit provisions. The ta 
ble examines plans with alternative normal retirement ages, but all 
with early retirement occurring at 55. Accrual rates at critical ages 
are shown in table 3.6. The figures are somewhat surprising, indi 
cating quite negative accrual ratios even for plans that fully credit 
postnormal retirement service; indeed, in certain cases, these nega 
tive accrual ratios are larger in absolute value than negative accrual 
ratios of plans that provide no credit. The accrual rates are affected 
not only by the plan provisions, but also by wage growth and by life 
expectancy. With fewer years to live, pension wealth can decline 
even if the benefit, upon receipt, is larger.
To isolate the impact of the choice of retirement provisions, ac 
crual ratios for percent of earnings plans with early retirement at 55 
and selected normal retirement ages are calculated, first assuming 
that all of the plans had a full credit provision, and second assuming 
that all the plans had no credit provision. These results are shown in 
table 3.7. The table indicates that the effect of crediting service after 
normal retirement depends importantly on the age of normal retire 
ment. For plans with a normal retirement age of 55, negative accrual 
ratios are larger in absolute value under no crediting prior to age 66 
and smaller in absolute value thereafter. In part, the differences re 
flect lower wage growth as workers age. Full credit incorporates 
credit for additional years of service, but also the effect of wage 
change.
Early and Normal Retirement Supplements
Approximately 11.4 percent of plans have early and 7.5 have nor 
mal retirement supplements. The typical normal retirement supple 
ment provides an addition to otherwise calculated benefits if the 
individual postpones retirement until the normal retirement age. The 
typical early retirement supplement provides an addition to benefits 
if retirement occurs after the age of early retirement.
The average accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans 
with supplements, with 10-year cliff vesting, and with early and nor 
mal retirement at 55 and 65 respectively, are shown in table 3.8 by 
type of supplement. There are only two plans in the category with
49
Table 3.7
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings 
Plans With 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early Retirement at 
55, by Normal Retirement Age, Assuming Full Credit and 




































































































































































Weighted Average Accrual Rates at Selected Ages for Percent 
of Earnings and Flat Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, Early 
and Normal Retirement at 55-65, and Early or Normal 
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only normal retirement supplements, but, nonetheless, the effect of 
the supplements can be seen in the first column of the table. The 
accrual rate jumps from about 8 percent of the wage at age 64, to 
60 percent of the wage at age 65. Thus the supplement apparently 
provides a relatively strong incentive to remain with the firm until 
age 65, but thereafter there is a sharp drop in the accrual rate to  18 
percent.
Accrual rates for plans with early retirement supplements are 
shown in the second column of the table. In this case there is a sharp 
increase in the accrual rate from . 12 at age 54 to .44 at age 55, with 
a sharp drop thereafter. Again, the provision seems to provide a sub 
stantial incentive to remain with the firm to the age of early retire 
ment, with a very substantial decline thereafter. Accrual rates for 
plans with both types of supplement are shown in the last column 
of the table. In this case there is a rather large spike at the age 
of early retirement, equal to 62 percent of the wage in that year, 
with a smaller, but still noticeable spike at about the age of normal 
retirement.
Accrual rates for percent of earnings and flat plans with either 
type of supplement are shown in appendix table 5 for selected early 
and normal retirement ages. The spikes in the accrual rates are 
highlighted with dashed lines. Consider, for example, plans with 
early retirement at age 55. The spike created by the early retire 
ment supplement is from .22 to .39 for plans with normal retirement 
at 55, from .12 to .50 for plans with normal retirement at 60, and 
from .11 to .48 for plans with normal retirement at 65. Of the 
56 plans with normal retirement at age 60, the pension accrual 
rate at that age is on average equivalent to 100 percent of the wage 
rate.
Similar discontinuities in the accrual ratios are evident for plans 
with other early and normal retirement ages. For example, of plans 
with early and normal retirement at age 60, the accrual rate at that 
age is equivalent to 64 percent of the annual wage for persons aged 
60. Thus these special supplements create very significant one-time 
additions to pension wealth and, therefore, provide very important 
incentives to remain with the firm until the age that the special sup-
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plement is awarded. The special supplements also further dramatize 
the wide variation in the incentive effects implicit in the provisions 
of private pension plans.
Flat Benefit Plans
Accrual ratios for flat benefit plans with selected early and normal 
retirement are shown in appendix table 6. This table can be com 
pared to appendix table 1 which presents comparable numbers for 
percent of earnings plans. The accrual profiles for flat plans with 
early-normal retirement at ages 55-55, 55-60, 55-65 are shown 
graphically in figure 3.6. In general, the accrual profiles for the flat 
benefit plans look quite similar to those for percent of earnings 
plans. Recall that we have assumed that the flat benefit increases 
with the rate of inflation, assumed to be 6 percent annually in our 
calculations. While it is not possible to make comparisons for plans
FIGURE 3.6 - Weighted average accrual rates for flat rate 
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with each of the early and normal retirement combinations because 
of the relatively small sample sizes, for several early-normal retire 
ment age combinations there are rather large numbers of plans of 
both types, e.g., the combinations 55-60, 55-65, and 60-65. The 
average decline in the accrual ratio between the age of early retire 
ment to age 66 is .30 for percent of earnings plans versus .39 for flat 
benefits plans in the case of the 55-60 retirement age combination. 
It is .25 versus .16 for the 55-65 combination, and .26 versus .17 
for the 60-65 combination.
Average accrual ratios at several critical ages for plans with early 
retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65 are shown below for 
percent of earnings and flat benefit plans:







The accrual rates for these plans at all ages are graphed in figure 
3.7. The evidence indicates that the two types of plan provide rather 
similar incentive effects.
The provisions of flat rate plans, like those of percent of earnings 
plans, also yield widely differing ratios, even among plans with the 
same early and normal retirement ages. Indications of the dispersion 
of the accrual ratios among flat plans with early and normal retire 
ment at 55 and 65 respectively are shown in appendix table 7. While 
the average accrual rate at age 55, for example, is 7 percent, the 
minimum value is 0 and the maximum 24 percent. Similarly at age 
56, while the average is about 5 percent, the maximum is 20 per 
cent, and the minimum is about 0. At 65, the average is 5 percent, 
with a maximum of almost 33 percent and a minimum of about  20 
percent. At 66, after the age of normal retirement, the average ac 
crual rate is  9 percent, while the minimum is  56 percent and the 
maximum 0. Thus the incentive for retirement varies widely among 
flat benefit, as well as percent of earnings plans.
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FIGURE 3.7 - Weighted average accrual rates for percent of 
earnings and flat rate plans with 10-year cliff vesting, early 
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Summary
This chapter has presented ratios of pension benefit accrual to 
wage earnings for a wide range of U.S. defined benefit pension 
plans. Typical plan provisions provide a strong incentive for retireT 
ment after the age of plan normal retirement, and a large proportion 
of plans provide a strong incentive for retirement after the age of 
early retirement. A striking feature of the incentive effects of pen 
sion plans is their wide variation across plans. For example, while 
the average plan may provide reduced, but still positive, accrual af 
ter the age of early retirement, for a large proportion of plans the 
accrual rate after this age is a sizeable negative number. Thus it 
would not be unusual for the reduction in pension benefit accrual 
after the age of early retirement to be equivalent to a 30 percent 
reduction in wage earnings. The accrual rate at the age of vesting can 
range from as low as 2 percent of wage earnings in that year to as
The Wage Carrot and the Pension Stick 55
high as 100 percent of wage earnings, depending upon the plan type 
and on the age of initial employment. Thus for some employees, 
vesting can be a very important determinant of job change decisions.
Special early and normal retirement supplements also add very 
substantially to accrued pension wealth at particular ages and thus 
encourage workers to remain with a firm until these benefits are re 
ceived. The accrual profiles under flat benefit plans are very similar 
to the profiles under percent of earnings plans, if one assumes that 
the flat benefit is increased to keep pace with the rate of inflation.
The evidence from a broad range of pension plans suggests the 
possibility that the rapid increase in pension plan coverage over the 
past two or three decades could have contributed very substantially 
to the reduction in the labor force participation of older workers dur 
ing this period. The plans may also have an important effect on labor 
mobility.

The Pension Cost of Job Change and
Sex, Industry, and Occupation
Differences in Accrual
This chapter considers two issues. First is the question of the costs 
of job change in terms of reduced pension benefits. The second 
concerns how pensions contribute to compensation differentials 
between males and females, between workers in different industries, 
and between workers in different occupations.
Cost of Changing to a No-Pension Job
There are many ways to think about the effect of job change on 
pension accrual and the potential incentive effects of pension provi 
sions on the job change decision. One approach is to consider the 
effect of job change on accrued pension wealth at the age of retire 
ment, say the age of normal retirement. Another way is to consider 
the expected loss in future pension wealth from changing jobs as a 
proportion of expected future wages. We consider both measures.
Consider a person who starts a job at some age, say 31. Suppose 
that at a given subsequent age the person could change to another 
job and obtain the same future wages as on the current job. Suppose 
his options are either to stay on the current job until normal retire 
ment or to switch to the second job and stay on that one until the age 
of normal retirement. But suppose that the new job has no pension. 
Then the loss in pension wealth is equal to the pension wealth that 
the worker would accrue if he were to stay with the current employer 
until the age of normal retirement. In other words, the loss is the 
proportion of future compensation, on the current job, that is in the 
form of pension benefits. This projected pension compensation mea 
sure differs from the accrued vested benefits measure examined 
above; it projects what the worker will accrue in benefits if he stays
57
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with the firm through normal retirement in contrast to the accrued 
vested benefits, which indicates what vested benefits the worker has 
accrued to date. The loss in projected benefits from job change rela 
tive to the present value of expected future wages is shown in appen 
dix tables 8, 9, and 10. These tables are all usable earnings-based as 
well as flat benefit plans.
Appendix table 8 assumes that an individual begins employment 
with the first firm at age 31. Appendix table 9 assumes a starting 
age of 41, and appendix table 10 a starting age of 51. The tables 
present these projected benefit-loss ratios by plan normal retirement 
age, and loss ratios are calculated through the age of normal retire 
ment. To obtain a more concise picture of the losses, they are shown 
for selected ages of job change in table 4.1. Note that there are 
no vesting spikes in these tables since we are considering projected, 
rather than accrued vested benefits. For plans with normal retirement 
at 65, the loss in pension wealth relative to expected wages is rela 
tively small, between 4 and 6 percent for all ages of job change, 
with the exception of job change at age 59 when joining the firm at 
age 51. In the latter case, the remaining working life of the individ 
ual is short, and he is not yet vested. Thus the loss in potential pen 
sion accrual is relatively large compared to future earnings.
Among plans with earlier normal retirement 55, 60, or 62 the 
potential loss in future pension accrual is considerably larger, typi 
cally on the order of 8 to 20 percent of future earnings. The loss 
if one changes jobs just before normal retirement, however, is, in 
some instances, much larger than this, as high as 30 to 50 percent. 
For example, if at age 31 one enters a plan with normal retirement 
at age 60, the loss ratio if one changes jobs at 59 is 31 percent. If 
the individual enters at 51 and leaves at 59, the loss is almost 
50 percent.
The greater relative loss with earlier normal retirement is shown 
in figure 4.1, which presents loss ratios versus age for plans with 
normal retirement at 55 and at 65, starting at age 31. Recall that the 
loss ratios indicate that at any age future pension accrual is a larger 
proportion of compensation with younger ages of normal retirement. 
Basically, this is because benefits will be collected over more retire-
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Table 4.1
Loss in Expected Pension Wealth if Change to No-Pension
Job, as Percent of Expected Wages by Age of Job Change,
Age of Starting Job, and Age of Normal Retirement9
Starting Age 
and 


























































Source Appendix tables 11, 12, 13
a. With expectations evaluated to plan normal retirement age
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FIGURE 4.1 - Loss in expected pension wealth if change to 
no-pension job, as a percent of expected wages, for normal 
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ment years. The comparisons reflect possible differences in age-wage 
profiles, due to different industry and occupation mixes, but do not 
match individual plan provisions and wage profiles.
The effect of starting age is shown graphically in figure 4.2 for 
plans with normal retirement at 60. The graphs and table 4.1 make 
clear that there is no simple relationship between the pension propor 
tion of future compensation and the age of hire. The proportion is 
unusually high, however, for persons hired at 51.
A limiting case of numbers like those presented in table 4.1 is the 
present discounted value of expected pension benefits at the age of 
hire as a proportion of expected future wages at that time. These 
numbers, of course, indicate the cost to the employer of pension ben 
efits versus wages if a person stays with the employer from the time 
of hire to the age of early or normal retirement. Such ratios are pre 
sented in table 4.2 by age of initial employment and plan normal 
retirement age. The ratios are presented first assuming that the indi 
vidual remains with the firm until the age of early retirement and
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FIGURE 4.2 - Loss in expected pension wealth if change to 
no-pension job, as a percent of expected wages, for normal 
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then assuming that the person remains until the age of normal retire 
ment. It can be seen from the table that the present discounted value 
of pension versus wage compensation is small on average, ranging 
from about 2 percent to about 10 percent. The average proportion of 
compensation in pension benefits is typically larger the later the age 
of initial employment. For example, the ratio of pension benefits to 
wages.for plans with normal retirement at 62 is .049 if one enters 
the firm at 31 and stays to the age of normal retirement. The ratio is 
.062 if one enters at 41, and .094 if one enters at 51. To the extent 
that this is true, pension provisions may mitigate against hiring older 
workers, unless their wages at subsequent ages are lower than those 
of workers of the same age but hired at younger ages. It is important 
to understand that while these ratios may appear relatively small, the 
pattern of pension accrual may still have a very substantial effect on 




Present Discounted Value of Expected Pension Benefits as a
Proportion of Expected Wages, at Age of Hire, by Age of Hire
and Plan Normal Retirement Age

























































The Wage Carrot and the Pension Stick 63
The most striking feature of these loss ratios is the wide variation 
among plans. To demonstrate the dispersion, the mean loss ratio to 
gether with the minimum and maximum at each age of job change 
are shown in table 4.3 for plans with normal retirement at 65 and for 
persons who enter the firm at age 31. Up to age 55—which is the 
age of early retirement for a substantial proportion of plans—the 
loss is close to zero for some plans and indeed is even negative for 
some. For other plans, however, the loss is very high, ranging up to 
26 percent of future earnings at age 54. After 55, the maximum 
loss is typically over 30 percent, while the minimum is close to —20 
percent at each age. Pension accrual after the age of early retirement
Table 4.3
Dispersion of Loss in Expected Pension Wealth if Change to
No-Pension Job, for Plans in Table 4.7 With Normal
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is negative in many instances. For a member of such a plan, it would 
pay to leave this firm, taking early retirement benefits, and join an 
other firm, assuming that one could join the second firm and obtain 
the same expected future wages. These data again demonstrate the 
very wide variation in the incentive effects inherent in pension plan 
provisions.
Job Change and Pension Wealth at Age of 
Normal Retirement
Pension wealth at the age of normal retirement (as opposed to the 
age of job change) may be reduced very substantially by job change, 
as shown in table 4.4. A person who began work at 31 and changed 
to another job at 41 would have accrued, on average, only 72 per 
cent of the pension wealth of a person who began at 31 and remained 
in the same firm. If he changed jobs at 41 and again at 51, he would 
accrue only 43 percent of the pension wealth of a person with no job 
change. This percent ranges from a low of 30 on average in trans 
portation to 60 percent in construction. Thus the loss in pension 
wealth with job change seems to provide a potentially large incentive 
against job mobility.
Because some plans place a limit on years of service that are cred 
ited in calculating benefits, it may in some instances pay to change 
jobs and begin to accrue benefits in a new plan. This leads to ratios 
that are greater than one in a few instances. The minimum and max 
imum values over all industries arise in anomalous plans, and these 
should not be given much weight; but they do suggest that there is 
substantial variation among plans in this respect, as well as in other 
respects discussed above.
Pension Accrual Ratios and Age of Initial Employment
Vested pension accrual rates for percent of earnings plans with 
10-year cliff vesting are shown in appendix tables 11 and 12 for 
persons beginning employment at ages 41 and 51 respectively. The 
tables are analogous to appendix table 1, presenting information by 
plan for early and normal retirement ages. To provide an easier 
comparison of the accrual rates by starting age, accrual rates for
Table 4.4
Weighted Average Pension Wealth (or Ratio) at Normal Retirement, by Age of 
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selected ages are shown in table 4.5. Accrual ratios for plans with 
early and normal retirement at 55 and 65, respectively, are graphed 
in figure 4.3.
The accrual rate at vesting is the most important difference across 
initial employment ages. For example, as shown in table 4.5, the ac 
crual rate at vesting is .24 for persons beginning employment at 31; 
it is .62 for those beginning at age 41 and .92 for those beginning at 
age 51. The difference is simply due to the fact that the later the age 
of initial employment, the nearer is the time of benefit receipt at the 
age of vesting. The accrual rate at vesting increases with age of 
initial employment for each early-normal retirement age category. 
Otherwise, the pattern of accrual rates does not vary by starting age, 
except that the absolute value of the rates, both positive and nega 
tive, is smaller as the age of initial employment increases. Again, 
this is simply because potential benefits are lower with later starting
FIGURE 4.3 - Weighted average accrual rates for percent of 
earnings plans with 10-year cliff vesting, early retirement at 55 
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Table 4.5
Pension Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans with 
10-Year Cliff Vesting, by Early and Normal Retirement Age 






















































































































































































































Source: Appendix tables 1, 14, and 15.
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ages and, thus, potential losses after the age of early or normal re 
tirement are smaller.
Notice that the accrual rate after the age of 65 is negative in each 
case. Plan provisions typically make the age of early and normal 
retirement dependent upon age and years of service. Thus, in prac 
tice, the ages of early and normal retirement are typically somewhat 
higher for persons beginning employment at age 51. But in no case 
is the age of normal retirement greater than 65.
Pension Accrual Rates and Pension Cost by Sex
Because women on average live longer than men, women will typ 
ically receive pension benefits longer than men. We consider here 
the effect of this difference in life expectancy on pension accrual and 
the value of pension benefits. The weighted average of the accrued 
benefits of women versus the accrued benefits of men by age are 
shown in table 4.6 for all plans in the sample. At the most common 
vesting age, 10 years, the ratio is about 1.08, so that women's 
vested benefits are approximately 8 percent higher than men's. The 
ratio increases gradually to about 1.10 at age 60 and about 1.13 at 
65. If otherwise identical men and women were to work until age 
70, the average ratio would be 1.17. The ratios do not vary signifi 
cantly by early and normal retirement age, and thus a breakdown by 
plan type is not presented.
Accrual Ratios by Industry and Occupation
Industry
Average accrual profiles for selected industries are shown in ap 
pendix table 13. For purposes of comparison and for ease of exposi 
tion, profiles are presented only for plans with early retirement at 
55, although profiles for three normal retirement ages, 55, 62, 65, 
are shown. The most apparent difference among industries is in the 
proportion of plans with particular early and normal retirement ages. 
For example, in retail trade and services almost all plans have nor 
mal retirement at 65, with only a few plans with early retirement at 
55 or 62. On the other hand, almost 62 percent of plans in transpor-
69
Table 4.6
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tation have early and normal retirement at 55, with approximately 
20 percent of plans reporting normal retirement at 62 and 20 percent 
at 65. In manufacturing, 66 percent of plans have normal retirement 
at 65, 28 percent at 62, and about 6 percent at 55.
Among plans with the same early and normal retirement age, 
however, appendix table 13 indicates little difference in average ac 
crual profiles across industries. Table 4.7 isolates accrual ratios at 
critical ages, in particular before and after the age of early retire 
ment and before and after the age of normal retirement. Averages are 
only presented for cells with more than 10 plans. Two dashes indi 
cate that there were fewer than 10. The cell was left blank if the 
corresponding age did not represent a critical age for the plan in 
question. Only in manufacturing and transportation were there a sub 
stantial number of plans with early and normal retirement at 55. In 
these two industries, the accrual profiles look very similar. Three 
industries had a significant number of plans with early retirement at 
55 and normal retirement at 62, and again there seems to be little 
noticeable difference in accrual patterns among the plans by indus 
try. All industries have plans with normal retirement at 65. But even 
in this case, the profiles seem quite similar. The only possible ex 
ception seems to be retail trade, where pension accrual relative to 
the wage rate is less generous than in the other industry groups.
Nonetheless, a typical worker apparently faces a much greater 
incentive to leave the labor force early in some industries than in 
others. For example, a large proportion of workers covered by pen 
sions in transportation would experience a 27 percent reduction in 
effective compensation by continuing to work between 55 and 56. 
While at 55 pension accrual would be equivalent to about 27 percent 
of wages for many workers in this industry, if the worker continued 
in the labor force until age 66, his annual loss in pension wealth 
would be equivalent to 30 percent of wage earnings at 66. A large 
proportion of workers in manufacturing have plans with early retire 
ment at 55 and normal retirement at 65. In this case, the accrual at 
55 averages about 9 percent of the wage at 55 and declines only to 
about 7 percent of the wage by 65. But then the accrual rate be 
comes negative, and if the worker were to continue in the labor force
71
Table 4.7
Weighted Average Accrual Rates at Selected Ages
for Percent of Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting
and Early Retirement at 55, by Early and Normal














































































































































72 Pension Cost of Job Change
between 65 and 66, the decline in pension accrual would amount to 
an effective reduction in compensation of about 21 percent.
Occupation
Among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages, the 
pension accrual ratios do not differ noticeably by occupation. Ac 
crual ratios for professionals, clerical workers, and production work 
ers are shown in appendix table 14 plans with early retirement at age 
55 and three normal retirement ages—55, 62, and 65. Plans in the 
55-65 group are graphed by occupation in figure 4.4.
According to the table and the figure, given the age of normal 
retirement, there is no substantial differences in average accrual ratios 
by occupational group. Consider, for example, plans with normal 
retirement at age 55: at age 55, the accrual ratio is .29 for profes 
sionals, .25 for clerical workers, and .25 for production workers. At
FIGURE 4.4 - Weighted average accrual rates for percent of 
earnings plans with 10-year cliff vesting, early retirement at 55 
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Note: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
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age 66, the accrual ratio has dropped to -.30 for professionals, 
— .30 for clerical workers, and — .29 for production workers. Simi 
larly, close ratios are observed for the other two normal retirement 
ages. For example, at age 62 the average accrual ratios for plans 
with normal retirement at 62 are .10 for professionals, .10 for cleri 
cal workers, and . 10 for production workers. This is not to say that 
there are no differences in pension accrual by occupational groups. It 
simply says that conditional on having a plan w;th given early and 
normal retirement ages, the accrual ratios for the occupational 
groups are very similar. The data in appendix table 14 may, however, 
be concealing intra-industry variation in accrual profiles by occupa 
tion for given retirement ages.
To address this potential ambiguity, accrual ratios for the same 
plans treated in appendix table 14 are presented in appendix table 15, 
but only for manufacturing. But here again there is very little differ 
ence in the accrual profiles by occupation. Consider, for example, 
the drop in accrual ratios between ages 55 and 66. For plans with 
normal retirement at age 55, the decline is .58 (.287 minus —.295) 
for professionals, .51 for clerical workers, and .50 for production 
workers. The corresponding declines are .29 for professionals, .30 
for clerical workers, and .35 for production workers, respectively, in 
plans with normal retirement at 62. Only among plans with normal 
retirement at age 65 is there a noticeable difference in the accrual 
ratios by occupation. In this case, the drop between age 55 and age 
66 is .29 for professionals, .25 for clerical workers, but somewhat 
less than .18 for production workers. Thus we conclude that differ 
ences in pension accrual ratios by occupation are primarily due to 
different plan types or to differences in early and normal retirement 
ages, given the general type of plan. Production workers, for exam 
ple, are more likely to have flat benefit plans than professionals.
Summary
While the expected loss in pension benefits due to job change is 
apparently relatively small in many instances, it is rather large in 
others, and there is wide variation among plans with the loss very 
high in some cases and, indeed, in other cases there may be a gain to
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changing jobs. In addition, accrued benefits at the age of retirement 
are typically much lower with job change than if a person remains on 
the same job.
Because women typically live longer than men, accrued pension 
benefits at any age are higher for women than for men, about 13 
percent on average at age 65, for example.
Given early and normal retirement ages, there is little difference in 
plan accrual profiles by industry or by occupation. Differences in 
pension benefits by industry depend more on the type of plan than on 
variations among plans with the same basic provisions.
Pension Accrual in a Large Firm
The actual relationship between pension accrual and retirement in 
a large Fortune 500 firm is considered in this chapter and chapter 6. 
The FIRM data are the employment and earnings histories between 
1969 and 1984 of all workers who were employed by the FIRM in 
any of the years between 1980 and 1984. The provisions of the 
FIRM'S pension plan are such that different workers face very dif 
ferent pension accrual profiles and, thus, pension compensation. As 
a consequence, different workers face very different incentives for 
continued work versus retirement. The analysis begins with descrip 
tions of the FIRM'S data, its pension plan, and the incentive effects 
of its pension plan. For purposes of comparison the accrual of social 
security benefits is described together with pension benefit accrual. 
The evaluation of the incentive effects of plan provisions requires the 
estimation of wage earnings. The procedure used to estimate these 
profiles is described in appendix III. Chapter 6 examines the rela 
tionship between wage earnings, pension wealth, and social security 
accrual, on the one hand, and the age of retirement (more precisely, 
departure from the FIRM), on the other.
The FIRM'S Data
Data are available for each worker employed in the FIRM at any 
time from the beginning of 1980 through the end of 1984. Most of 
these workers were in the FIRM in more than one year and many 
for all years. These years define the sample. Earnings for workers in 
the sample are available beginning in 1969, if the worker was em 
ployed then, or beginning in the year that the person joined the 
FIRM, if it was after 1969. Thus it is possible to follow the same 
person for up to 17 years. In particular, it is possible to estimate 
individual-specific earnings effects. By combining data for workers 
of different ages and with different years of service in the FIRM, it
75
76 Pension Accrual in a Large Firm
is possible to predict earnings. We use these predicted earnings, to 
gether with pension and social security accrual, to consider the in 
centive to leave the FIRM.
In addition to the earnings information, the data contain the work 
er's age, service, sex, and whether he or she is a manager, a sales- 
worker, or an office worker. Unfortunately we only know the 
worker's current job classification; i.e., we cannot tell whether a 
worker has changed jobs in the past. We also have no information on 
health, education, assets, or marital status, all of which may influ 
ence the retirement decision.
Plan Provisions
The FIRM has a defined benefit pension plan with earnings- 
related benefits and a social security offset. The plan's early and 
normal retirement ages are 55 and 65 respectively with vesting 
after 10 years. Actuarially reduced benefits are available starting at 
age 55 for vested terminators—vested workers who leave the FIRM 
prior to age 55. For early retirees—workers who retire between ages 
55 and 65—less than actuarial ly reduced benefits are provided. For 
workers who retire after age 65 there is no special actuarial benefit 
increase.
In addition to the more favorable benefit reduction afforded to 
early retirees, early retirees receive a supplemental benefit equal to 
their social security offset between the time they retire and the time 
they reach age 65. Hence, in comparison to a vested terminator who 
leaves the FIRM at age 54 and starts collecting benefits at age 55, 
an early retiree who leaves at age 55 enjoys a smaller benefit reduc 
tion and also receives a supplemental benefit until age 65. Not sur 
prisingly, the profile of vested accrued benefits by age jumps sharply 
for most workers at age 55. Thus there is a large bonus for remain 
ing with the FIRM until age 55.
The formula for the basic benefit before reduction for early retire 
ment and before any applicable social security offset is the average 
earnings base times 2 percent times the first N years of continuous 
service (where N lies between 15 and 25), plus 1 percent times the 
rest of continuous service:
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(10) Benefits = (Earnings Base) [(.02)(Service)]
if Service is less than N years
Benefits = (Earnings Base) [(.02)(Service) + (.01)(Service - N)] 
if Service is greater than N years.
The average earnings base is calculated based on earnings between 
the start year and the year of either vested termination or retirement. 
The start year has traditionally been increased by two years every 
other year, varying from 7 to 8 years before the current years. In our 
accrual calculations we assume a one- or two-year increase in the start 
year every two years. Excluding the two lowest years of earnings 
(except that the number of earnings years used can't be reduced below 
five), the earnings base is calculated as the average annual earnings 
from the start year to the year of vested termination or retirement.
The social security adjustment is a complex service-related func 
tion of the social security benefit calculated by the FIRM. The 
FIRM'S calculation of the worker's age 65 social security benefit, is 
based on the worker's earnings to date with the FIRM. In the social 
security benefit formula, earnings last year are extrapolated forward, 
assuming no growth factor, until the worker reaches age 65. The 
average of past earnings with the FIRM as well as extrapolated fu 
ture earnings is then entered into a three-bracket progressive benefit 
formula to arrive at the FIRM'S calculation of the worker's social 
security benefit.
For early retirees, the factor by which benefits are reduced de 
pends on age and service. For example, if the worker retires at age 
55 with 20 years of service, the reduction is 50 percent; it would be 
only 33 percent if the worker had 26 or more years of service. For 
workers with 30 or more years of service, the reduction drops to 
zero at retirement ages between 60 and 64.
The pension accrual can vary widely for workers of the same age 
but with different service and for workers with the same service but 
of different ages. These accrual differences reflect the fact that many 
of the features of the benefit and social security formulae involve 
either age or service or both. Indeed, it is fair to say that the FIRM'S 
benefit formula could hardly be better designed from the perspective
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of maximizing service and age-related differences in accruals. This 
variation comes at the cost of a fairly complicated set of provisions 
which may not be fully understood by individual workers.
Pension Accrual
To describe the effect of the provisions on pension wealth, the 
accrual profiles for persons born and hired by the FIRM in several 
different years have been calculated for the calendar period begin 
ning in 1980. For each employee group defined by year of birth and 
year of hire, accruals are calculated through age 70; the number of 
years of accruals that are presented thus depends on the age of the 
employee in 1980. One profile is graphed in figure 5.1. It is used as 
an illustration to explain the derivation of such profiles. Profiles for 
different employee and age groups are discussed in the next section.
The graph shows the pension accrual profile for male managers 
born in 1930 and hired by the FIRM in 1960. By 1980, they were 50
FIGURE 5.1 - Pension wealth accrual, social security accrual 
and wage earnings for male managers born in 1930 and hired 
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and had 20 years of service with the FIRM. (To calculate pension 
accrual, we have used the convention that a person hired in a given 
year has one year of experience in that year. Thus in some of the 
tables, the person used in this example would be assumed to have 21 
years of experience in 1980.) The accrual of social security benefits 
is shown on the same graph. Predicted wage earnings (see appendix 
III) for each year are also shown. These predictions are based on 
actual average earnings of FIRM employees, by age and years of 
service. All of the numbers presented in this chapter and the next are 
in real 1985 dollars.
At age 50, in 1980, the typical male manager has wage earnings 
of about $48,446 per year. Compensation in the form of pension ac 
crual is $2,646, or about 6 percent of wage earnings. If the manager 
were to retire at this age, he would be entitled to benefits at 65, 
based on his earnings in the seven or eight preceding years. The 
benefits would not be available until age 65, and thus have a rela 
tively low present value at age 50.
As described above, normal retirement benefits for a worker retir 
ing before age 55 can be taken earlier, as early as age 55, but they 
will be reduced actuarially such that the present discounted value of 
the benefits as of the age of retirement remains unchanged. The re 
duction in the benefit will be just enough to offset the fact that ben 
efits will be received for more years. If the person remains in the 
FIRM until age 55 and then retires, however, benefits are available 
immediately and the reduction in benefits for early retirement is less 
than the actuarial reduction. In addition, the worker who remains 
until age 55 and then retires is eligible to receive a supplemental 
benefit until age 65 equal to his social security offset. Thus there is 
a very large increase in pension wealth at age 55, $72,527, corre 
sponding to the large spike in the graph. In effect, there is a bonus 
of $72,527 for remaining in the FIRM from age 54 to 55.
Pension accrual falls after age 55 to about 10 percent of the wage at 
age 60 (in 1990). Accrual is larger after age 55 than just before age 55 
primarily because the early retirement reduction factor, if the worker 
remains until 55, is less than it would be if he (she) left the FIRM 
before 55. (If he (she) leaves before 55, the reduction is actuarial ly
80 Pension Accrual in a Large Firm
fair.) But as the worker ages beyond 56, this effect is partially offset 
by the fact that an additional year of service adds only 1 percent, 
instead of 2 percent to benefits. Pension accrual is in fact negative 
beginning at age 61 (in 1991). Indeed, between ages 61 and 65, the 
loss in pension benefits is equivalent to about 20 percent of wage 
compensation.
The loss in compensation between ages 60 and 61 is equivalent to 
a wage cut of about 14 percent. The worker has 30 years of service 
at that age and, because of the plan's early retirement reduction fac 
tors, is already eligible for full retirement benefits. Thus no increase 
in benefits will result for working another year, as was the case be 
fore 30 years of service. In addition, for each year that benefits are 
not taken between ages 55 and 65, the receipt of benefits for a year 
without the social security adjustment (reduction) is foregone. This 
advantage is lost at age 65 (in 1955). Thereafter, the loss in benefits 
from working an additional year is smaller because this formerly
FIGURE 5.2 - Pension wealth accrual, social security accrual 
and wage earnigs for male managers born in 1960 and hired in 
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foregone opportunity is no longer available. In addition, the accruals 
depend on the social security adjustment, and to a small extent 
on the updating of the years used in the calculation of the earnings 
base.
Social security accrual for the male manager considered in figure 
5.2 ranges from about $1,000 to $8,000 between age 50 and 65. After 
65, social security accrual becomes negative, about —$8,500 at age 66.
In summary, the typical manager in the FIRM, making about 
$48,000 per year in wage earnings at age 60, would lose about 
$42,000 in pension wealth were he to continue working until age 65. 
Thus, in addition to the expected concentration of retirement at age 
55, we would expect a large proportion of this group to retire before 
65. After age 65, social security benefit accrual also becomes nega 
tive. At 66, the loss in private pension benefits and social security 
benefits together amounts to about 32 percent of wage earnings at 
that age. This suggests a concentration of retirement at 65 as well.
FIGURE 5.3 - Cumulated total income from employment 
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The data in figure 5.1 are shown in the standard budget constraint 
form in figure 5.3. Total pretax compensation, including wage earn 
ings, social security wealth, and pension wealth, is graphed against 
age, beginning in 1980. The vertical axis shows the total resources 
accumulated with interest up to age 65 that the person would acquire 
from employment with this FIRM. Accumulated earnings before 
1980 are ignored in the graph.
There is a discontinuous jump in the graph at age 55. For reason 
able preferences for income (that can be used for consumption) ver 
sus retirement leisure, one would expect to see a large proportion of 
workers facing this constraint retiring at age 55 and most retiring 
prior to age 65. This graph, however, does not suggest the strong 
concentration of retirement exactly at age 65, that is revealed in the 
data presented below.
Additional graphs showing pretax wage earnings, pension accrual, 
and social security accrual over the working span are shown in fig 
ures 5.2 and 5.4; again, the first shows accruals by year, and the
FIGURE 5.4 - Cumulated total income from employment 
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second shows cumulated amounts in the standard budget constraint 
form. These graphs pertain to a male manager who is hired in 1980, 
at age 20, and who continues working with the FIRM until age 70. 
For such workers, the pension accrual at age 55 is $168,000, equiv 
alent to 164 percent of the wage at that age. Wage earnings for this 
group reach a maximum at age 59. Pension benefit accrual becomes 
negative at age 61, and social security benefit accrual becomes neg 
ative at age 65. In the first year of work after age 65 the loss in 
pension benefits and social security benefits together amounts to 
$40,000, about 45 percent of wage earnings at that age. Thus the 
lifetime budget constraint shows an upward discontinuity at age 55 
and a decline in the rate of wage increase around age 60. The de 
cline is especially abrupt after age 65. Retirement at age 55, between 
55 and 65, and possibly at 65 would seem to be quite likely for 
workers facing budget constraints like this one. The calculations 
underlying the pension accruals, are explained in appendix II.
Variation in Accrual Profiles by Age and Year of Hire
The two accrual profiles discussed above pertain to persons who 
were born in a given year and who were hired by the FIRM in a 
given year. The profile in the calendar period beginning in 1980 may 
be quite different for persons of different ages and with different 
years of service. Thus, profiles have been calculated for several ad 
ditional groups, 15 in all, defined by year of birth and year of hire, 
as follows:
Year of 
Birth Year of Hire
1960 1980
1950 1980 1975
1940 1980 1975 1970
1930 1980 1975 1970 1960
1920 1980 1975 1970 1960 1950
Pension accruals for managers with these birth and hire years are 
shown in appendix table 16. Those born in 1940 reach age 55 in
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1995, and for each of these groups there is a discontinuous increase 
in pension wealth in that year. It is $29,639 for those with 15 years 
of service in that year and $82,953 for those with 25 years of 
service. Comparable jumps occur in 1985 for those born in 1930. 
Accruals are often negative for persons over 60.
Pension accruals provide a large incentive for some groups to stay 
in the FIRM for another year and strong incentive for others to 
leave. For example, staying with the FIRM in 1985 brings pension 
accrual of $72,527 for 55-year-old managers with 25 years of service 
(born in 1930 and hired in 1960), but a loss of $14,936 for 65-year- 
olds with 35 years of experience (born in 1920 and hired in 1950). 
Thus there is enormous variation in the effective compensation for 
continued service. One might expect therefore that some groups 
would be much more likely than others to retire in a given year.
In some instances there are erratic fluctuations from one year 
to the next, from negative to positive to negative for example. This 
typically occurs if an increase in benefits in one year is not followed 
by a comparable increase in the next. For example, suppose that 
the normal retirement benefit is higher in year a than in either year 
a—1 or in year a+1. Then the accrual from year a—1 to year a 
will tend to be positive, but the accrual from year a to year a+1 will 
tend to be negative. Dropping a low earnings year and adding a 
higher one in the calculation of the earnings base may create this 
effect. Other provisions in the pension calculation formula may do 
so as well. For convenience, total cumulated pension wealth is 
shown in appendix table 17 for the same groups. Social security 
accruals and cumulated social security wealth are shown in 
appendix tables 18 and 19 respectively. Pretax annual wage earnings 
and cumulated pretax earnings are shown in appendix tables 20 
and 21.
Graphs of two of the profiles are shown in figures 5.3 and 5.4; 
several others are shown below. Young new hires will have rapid 
wage growth in the subsequent 20 years, but very little accrual of 
pension wealth. This is shown in figure 5.2 above for persons born 
in 1960, and 20 years old at the time of hire in 1980. Their incomes 
will rise from about $20,000 in 1980 to over $70,000 in the year
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2000, when they are 40 years old. But even in 2000 their pension 
accrual will be only $1,558. Their total accrued pension wealth at 
age 40 will be only $11,894, a very small fraction (1.2 percent) of 
their total earnings over the period.
A manager hired in 1980, but born in 1940, will have much lower 
wage growth over the next 20 years, from about $28,000 in 1980 to 
under $52,000 at age 60 in 2000. This person will also have little 
pension wealth accrual through age 54, when his total pension 
wealth will be less than $13,000. In 1995, however, when the person 
is 55 and eligible for early retirement, it will increase by almost 
$30,000 to a total of over $47,000. In the next few years, accrual is 
less than $7,000 per year. The age 55 spike in accrual suggests a 
potential concentration of retirement among this group at age 55 (in 
1995). But the actual pension that would be received is still very 
small, only about 12 percent of salary (from tables not shown). Thus 
retirement may be unlikely.
Managers of the same age, but hired 10 years earlier, may be 
much more likely to retire in that year. They experience a much 
sharper increase in pension wealth in 1985, from just under $42,000 
to over $133,000. The pension benefit to wage replacement rate at 
55 for this group is about 26 percent. But accrual after 55 remains 
positive for this group; pension wealth increases to almost $209,000 
by age 60. Thus pension wealth accrual may still provide a substan 
tial incentive to remain with the FIRM.
In contrast, persons born in 1920 and hired by the FIRM at age 40 
(in 1960) will have essentially no pension accrual in 1985, and, in 
deed, it will become negative in a few years. Earnings for this group 
are declining as well. One might think that persons who are in this 
group and are still working would be likely to retire. But, if still 
working, they chose not to retire earlier, when compensation from 
continued work began to decline. They would have been eligible for 
early retirement at age 55 (in 1975), when they had been employed 
for 15 years.
At that time they would have faced earnings and pension accrual 
profiles like those born and hired 10 years later (in 1930 and 1970 
respectively) and who thus had 15 years of service at age 55 (in
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1985), when pension accrual was at a maximum. Thereafter, accrual 
declines and becomes negative around age 65, after 25 years of ser 
vice. That the group born in 1920 and hired at age 40 didn't retire 
earlier may suggest that their preferences are such that they are also 
not likely to retire in a given subsequent year either. They may want 
to work more than others and that's why they didn't retire when 
pension accrual and earnings started to decline. In addition, how 
ever, the group had not accumulated substantial pension wealth at 
any time, even before it began to decline, and thus may always have 
been in a poor position to leave the labor force.
Variation by Employee Type
The pension accrual profiles for other employee groups look very 
much like those described above. Accrual is minimal during the first 
years of service. There is typically a discontinuous increase in pen 
sion wealth at age 55. And accrual typically becomes negative after 
30 years of service, sometimes before that. Social security accrual
FIGURE 5.5 - Pension wealth accrual, social security accrual 
and wage earnings for salesmen born in 1960 and hired in 1980, 
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FIGURE 5.6 - Cumulated total income from employment 
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becomes negative after 65. The major differences among the groups 
stem from different age-earnings profiles. An illustration of the sim 
ilarity and difference is provided by graphs like that in figures 5.2 
and 5.4, but for a different employee group. They are shown in fig 
ures 5.5 and 5.6 for salesmen. The data, like those graphed in figure 
5.2, pertain to persons born in 1960 and hired in 1980. Thus they 
pertain to compensation over the lifecycle for persons who remain in 
the FIRM. As is clear from the graphs, the accrual profiles are qual 
itatively similar; but there are some important differences.
First, managers earn more than the other employee groups. The 
wage earnings profiles also differ in shape. The peak earnings for 
managers occur at age 59. At age 66, if they still are in the labor 
force, 45 percent of their wage earnings are offset by negative pen 
sion and social security accrual. The earnings of salesmen peak 
much earlier, at age 50. At age 66, almost 95 percent of their wage 
earnings are offset by loss in pension and social security wealth. 
Thus this effect creates a greater incentive for the salesmen than for
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the managers to retire after age 65. 8 The peak wage earnings for 
saleswomen occurs at age 57; at 66 almost 75 percent of their wage 
earnings are offset by pension and social security wealth losses. The 
peak earnings for male and female office workers occurs at ages 59 
and 62, respectively. At age 66, 48 and 46 percent, respectively, of 
their earnings would be offset by loss in pension and social security 
wealth. 9
Summary
Pension accrual in the FIRM, a large Fortune 500 company, ex 
hibits a dramatic increase at the FIRM'S early retirement age with 
accrual beyond that age typically small or negative depending on the 
worker's age and service. The early retirement accrual spike reflects 
the FIRM'S less than actuarial reduction in early retirement benefits 
as well as its payment to early retirees of a supplemental benefit 
between the age of retirement and age 65. Workers in the FIRM 
have a significant incentive to remain with the FIRM until early re 
tirement and then face a possibly significant incentive to leave the 
FIRM. The retirement incentive generated by the FIRM'S pension 
plan is quite substantial when compared to that generated by social 
security.
Consideration of the FIRM'S accrual profiles together with those 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 suggests that ERISA legislation has 
not precluded significant backloading within U.S. pension plans. 
Rather than backload pension benefits by requiring a very long pe 
riod of service prior to vesting, pension plans can effectively back- 
load benefits by requiring very long periods of service prior to the 
receipt of significant benefits. Workers with more than 10 years of 
service (5 years under the 1986 Tax Reform Act) who are terminated 
in highly backloaded plans prior to the age of early retirement will 
receive a benefit, but the benefit may be quite small. In its effect, 
the current system permits essentially the same behavior of terminat 
ing a worker prior to a specific age and, therefore, depriving the 
worker of his (her) benefits that occurred prior to ERISA when firms 
were free to set freely service requirements for vesting.
6
The Relationship Between Retirement, 
Age, and Years of Service
This chapter examines the relationship of retirement to age and 
years of service. Its objective is to consider the extent to which re 
tirement behavior accords with the budget constraints described in 
chapter 5. To do this, we consider empirical hazard rates by age and 
years of service.
Empirical Hazard Rates
Hazard rates by age and years of service are shown for all employ 
ees combined in table 6.1. The yearly hazard rate is the proportion 
of those employed at the beginning of the year who retire—more 
strictly speaking, leave the firm—during the forthcoming year. Sev 
eral aspects of the data stand out. There is substantial turnover in the 
first nine years of employment, especially during the first five years. 
On average, about 15 percent of those employed five years or less 
leave in a given year. The table shows rates only for employees 40 
and older. The departure rates are somewhat higher for younger 
workers, 16 or 17 percent for those employed five years or less and 
10 to 12 percent for those employed six to nine years. There is a 
sharp decline in departure rates at 10 years of service, when employ 
ees are about to become vested in the pension plan. Before the early 
retirement age, 55, the typical decline is from 8 or 9 to 4 or 5 per 
cent. After 55, when vesting carries with it eligibility for early re 
tirement, it is much sharper, often from 10 percent or more to 3 
percent or less.
The availability of early retirement benefits at 55 apparently has a 
substantial effect on retirement. Before 55 departure rates are typi 
cally around 2 percent. At 55, they jump to 10 percent or more. It is 




Empirical Hazard Rates, by Age and Years of Service, 












































































































































































































































































































































62 11 15 7 27 34 37 34 33 38 40 42 34 30 41
63 14 18 4 33 35 37 43 35 43 41 62 33 47 40
64 5 8 3 36 33 34 18 32 26 27 42 53 41 34
65 12 35 45 57 52 54 44 55 57 70 50 54 69 59
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age 60, when there is another jump in the rate of departure. The 
jump at 60 corresponds to the age at which pension accrual becomes 
negative for many employees. (For those with 25 or more years of 
service, benefits increase at y instead of x percent per year. After age 
60, with 30 years of service, there is no early retirement reduction; 
full retirement benefits are available.)
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement 
benefits, suppose that if it were not for this inducement, the depar 
ture rates would remain at 3 percent until age 60, instead of the 10 
or 12 percent rates that are observed. (Notice that the departure rates 
for employees aged 55 to 61 who are in their 10th year of service— 
not yet vested and hence not eligible for early retirement benefits— 
are also 2 or 3 percent on average.) Departure at 3 percent per year 
would mean that 14 percent of those who were employed at 55 
would have left before age 60. At a departure rate of 11 percent per 
year, 44 percent would leave between 55 and 59. Such a difference, 
even if only for a small proportion of all firms, can have a very 
substantial effect on aggregate labor force participation rates, even 
after one accounts for those workers who leave their main jobs and 
become reemployed. It is in part the dramatic fall in labor force par 
ticipation rates for the older population that has motivated research 
such as ours.
The jump in departure rates at 60, especially noticeable for per 
sons with 25 or more years of service, has been mentioned just 
above. There is another sharp increase in departure rates at 62 when 
social security benefits are first available. (There is no sharp kink in 
the budget constraint at this age because of the actuarially fair in 
crease in social security benefits if their receipt is postponed until 
age 65.) The increase at 62 is also noticeable for employees with 
less than 10 years of service and not yet vested in the firm's pension 
plan. They can take social security benefits, of course.
Finally, there is a very sharp increase in the departure rate at age 
65. At this age the loss in social security benefits with continued 
work induces a kink in the budget constraint. As described above, 
the budget constraint for many workers becomes essentially flat at 
this age, due to negative pension accruals and falling wage earnings,
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as well as the loss in social security wealth. The fall in wage earn 
ings and pension wealth typically begins at an earlier age, as empha 
sized above. It is important to keep in mind that the large departure 
rates before 65 mean that most employees have left well before that 
age. Thus high departure rates at 65 indicate only that a large pro 
portion of the few that continue work until 65 retire then. The cu 
mulative hazard rates below highlight this point.
A more compact version of table 6.1 is shown in table 6.2 for 
salesmen. About 40.7 percent of employees are salesmen and sales 
women, about 56.2 percent are office workers, and only 3.1 percent 
managers. Thus for purposes of comparison, it is best to have in 
mind the accrual and budget constraint graphs for sales and office 
workers. These results confirm the findings for all employees dis 
cussed above. They may be summarized briefly:
• There is a large increase in the departure rates at the early 
retirement age of 55, but only for vested employees, those with 
at least 10 years of service. For employees with 16 or more 
years of service, the jump in departure rates increases noticeably 
with age.
• The departure rates remain at these higher rates through age 59.
• At age 60, the departure rates increase precipitously for persons 
with 30 or more years service for whom full benefits are avail 
able; there is no longer an early retirement reduction and subse 
quent pension accrual is negative.
• When social security benefits become available at 62, the depar 
ture rates increase very sharply, but apparently only for those 
who are vested in the FIRM plan, contrary to the results for all 
employees taken together.
• Finally, there is a large increase in departure rates at 65, after 
which social security accrual becomes strongly negative.
Cumulative hazard rates for all employees are shown in table 6.3 
for three years, together with the rates by age. The cumulative rates 
are one minus the percent who have departed. These departure rates 
were obtained by calculating hazard rates over the next four years 
separately for persons who were age 50 in 1980, age 51 in
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Table 6.2
Empirical Hazard Rates for Salesmen by Age 









































































































1980, . . . , and age 63 in 1980. Those who were age 50 in 1980 
were 51 in 1981, 52 in 1982, etc. Thus these calculations yield haz 
ard rates in different years for employees of the same age. In partic 
ular, given employment at age 50, the cumulative rates show the 
percent still employed at older ages. (The cumulative rates for those 
aged 50 are all based on the 1980 departure rate of .031. The rates 
for those aged 51 are all based on the 1981 rate of .033. The 1983 
rate for those aged 52 is based on the 1982 rate. The rate for those 
who were 65 in 1981 is based on the 1983 rate.)
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Table 6.3
Cumulative and Yearly Hazard Rates by Calendar Year, 
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Note first that departure rates of employees who have been in the 
firm for only 8 to 10 years and are not yet vested are very low at 
every age, as emphasized above. And again, the increase in the de 
parture rates at 55, 60, 62, and 65 stands out. Based on the 1981 
and 1982 departure rates, only 48 percent of those employed at 50 
would still be employed at 60, and then 17 percent of these would 
leave. Only 10 percent would remain until age 65 and then about 50 
percent of these would leave.
The data also show the effect of a special early retirement incen 
tive that was in effect in 1982 only. The incentive program provided 
a bonus to employees who were eligible for early retirement in 1982; 
that is, those who were vested and were 55 years old or older. The 
bonus was equivalent to three months salary for 55-year-old employ 
ees and increased to 12 months salary for 60-year-olds. At age 65, 
the bonus was 12 months salary for employees with 20 or fewer 
years of service and declined to 6 months salary for those with 30 to 
39 years of service.
It is clear that the effect of the incentive was large. The departure 
rates for 1981 and for 1983 are virtually identical. But the rates were 
much higher in 1982. For example, the departure rate for 60-year- 
olds was 17 percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 32 percent in 1982. For 
those age 63, the departure rate was 37 percent in 1981 and in 1983, 
but 54 percent in 1982. Of those employed at age 50, 40 percent 
would still have been employed after age 60 based on the 1981 and 
1983 departure rates. Only 27 percent would remain after age 60 
based on the 1982 rates. I0
Even under the normal plan, only 10 percent of those employed at 
age 50 would still be employed at 65. Only 1 percent would remain 
until 65 with the special incentive.
Summary
Favorable early retirement benefits have a very strong effect on 
departures from the FIRM, possibly increasing departure rates be 
tween ages 55 and 60 by as much as 30 percentage points (e.g., 
from 14 to 44 percent).
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The loss in compensation due to negative pension accrual for 
many employees after age 60 and negative social security accrual 
after age 65 apparently also induce departure; only 58 percent of 
those employed at age 54 remain through 64. About half of the few 
remaining at 65 retire at that age.
The special early retirement incentive offered by the FIRM in one 
year increased departure rates very substantially.
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Summary and Conclusions
This monograph begins with an examination of pension accrual 
for a representative sample of U.S. defined benefit plans. While the 
present value of pension accrual is typically a small component of 
total labor compensation, at many ages and years of service pension 
accrual significantly raises total compensation, and at other age and 
service combinations, (negative) pension accrual significantly lowers 
total compensation. For a sizeable fraction of defined benefit plans, 
the special shape of age- and service-pension accrual profiles pro 
duce significant incentives to remain with one's current employer 
prior to at least early retirement. After the age of normal retirement, 
and, often, early retirement, pension accrual profiles typically pro 
vide substantial incentives to leave employment. These retirement 
incentives appear large when compared, for example, with the retire 
ment incentives arising under social security. Hence, the structure of 
private pensions may have contributed substantially to the recent 
large reduction in the labor force participation in the United States.
The monograph also examines in considerable detail the provi 
sions of the pension plan in a large corporation. The implications of 
the provisions are again described by pension accrual profiles. The 
pension accrual profiles are set forth together with standard age- 
earnings profiles and social security accrual profiles in the form of 
lifetime budget constraints. The plan provides strong incentives to 
retire beginning at age 55. After age 65, negative pension accruals 
and negative social security accruals effectively impose almost a 100 
percent tax rate on wage earnings for many employees of the FIRM.
Departure rates from the FIRM have been compared with eco 
nomic incentives inherent in the plan provisions. It is clear from this 
descriptive analysis that the inducements in the plan provisions to 
retire early have had a very substantial effect on departure rates from 
the FIRM. Indeed over 50 percent of those employed by the FIRM
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at age 50 leave before 60, and 90 percent leave before age 65. The 
jumps in departure rates at specific ages coincide precisely with the 
discontinuities and kink points in the worker compensation profiles 
that result from the pension plan provisions together with wage earn 
ings profiles and social security accrual.
A great deal of effort has been devoted to estimating the effect of 
social security provisions on labor force participation. In particular, 
Hausman and Wise (1985), Burtless (1986), and Hurd and Boskin 
(1984) have attempted to estimate the effect on labor force partici 
pation of the increases in social security benefits during the early 
1970s. It would appear from the results here that the effects of these 
across-the-board increases in social security benefits are likely to be 
small relative to the effects of the private pension provisions. For 
example, it seems clear that shifting the age of early retirement from 
55 to say 60 would have a very dramatic effect on departure rates 
from the FIRM. Leaving the early retirement age at 55, but elimi 
nating negative pension and social security accruals would appar 
ently also have a substantial effect on retirement rates.
The shape of pension accrual profiles appears to rule out the spot 
market theory of labor market equilibrium. Under the alternative, 
contractual view of labor markets, pension accrual profiles can be 
understood as mechanisms to limit worker mobility and to provide 
carrot- and stick-type incentives to continue working diligently.
This presumes that pension accrual profiles are well understood by 
both employers and workers. In our view, the great complexity of 
pension provisions makes it quite difficult for either employers or 
workers, in the absence of assistance from actuaries, to calculate 
correctly their accrued pension benefits. While a few firms, includ 
ing the large FIRM examined here, provide accrual information an 
nually to their workers, most, apparently, do not. It also appears that 
many firms with access to actuaries do not have their actuaries cal 
culate worker-specific accrual for their own internal use.
The backloading of pension accrual in the presence of limited 
worker and employer understanding of such backloading raises a va 
riety of quite important questions. Do workers over- or under-value 
their accrued vested pension benefits? Do workers over- or under-
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save because they under- or over-value their pensions? Are workers 
who leave highly backloaded firms prior to the age of early retire 
ment, at which age accrual is often very substantial, aware of the 
often substantial pension costs of their actions? Is accrual backload- 
ing raising the economic costs of early disability, because workers 
who become disabled prior to the age of early retirement receive less 
generous pensions then those who remain through early retirement? 
These and related questions need to be asked by employers, workers, 
and, apparently, by the United States Congress.
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NOTES
1. This assumes no other explicit or implicit fringe benefits.
2. Bulow (1979) appears to be the first discussion of these discontinuities. 
Lazear (1981; 1983) presents empirical analysis of this, issue.
3. In particular, if the percent decrease in the wage, [W(a+l)—W(a)]/ 
W(a+l), is less than the percentage increase in years of employment, 1/t, 
benefits would decrease.
4. This example, and subsequent ones as well, assume that the benefit 
depends on average earnings over the last five years of service, rather than 
the last year alone.
5. We make no use here of the truncated earnings data contained in the 
RHS social security earnings records.
6. The 1,183 earnings-based plans with ten-year cliff vesting account for 
51 percent of plans weighted by pension coverage.
7. Our calculations ignore service requirements for early retirement, since 
this inclusion could have considerably complicated our accrual computa 
tions. Excluding early retirement service requirements from the analysis is 
not likely to significantly alter the results. Virtually all workers covered by 
such requirements are enrolled in plans with early retirement service re 
quirements of 15 years or less (Kotlikoff and Smith 1983).
8. Managerial compensation is primarily in the form of salary, whereas 
the compensation of salesmen is in the form of commissions to a large 
extent. They may be more like self-employed or piece rate workers. In par 
ticular, their earnings may be determined to a large extent by the number of 
hours that they choose to work. This may also affect the relationship be 
tween compensation and retirement. FIRM officials inform us, however, 
that most salespeople work only for the FIRM. To the extent that the num 
bers of hours that they work do not decline substantially with the wage, 
profiles reflect age-productivity profiles.
9. There should be no presumption that men and women classified by us 
as office workers are performing the same jobs. The classification does not 
assure that.
10. This comparison may not be precise because the special incentive, were 
it to be prolonged, would alter the retirement rates prior to each of the ages 
considered in 1982.
Appendix I 
Pension Accrual Formulae with Early Retirement
The source of discontinuities in age-accrual profiles is clarified by con 
sidering a simple earnings-related defined benefit plan with cliff vesting at 
10 years of service. Vested accrued benefits are clearly zero prior to the age 
at which the worker has 10 years of credited service in the plan. Let R(a,t) 
denote the ratio of I(a) to W(a) for a worker age a with t years of tenure. 
Then R(a,t) is zero for t < 9. If a person age a with 9 years of service 
works an additional year, the ratio of the increment to the wage W(a) is:
B(a,t)A(55)(l +d)~ 10(1 + r)-l55-<a+ DJ 
(Al) R(a,9)= —— —— —— - ————— •
W(a)
In (Al), B(a,t) is the retirement benefit available to the worker who termi 
nates employment with the plan sponsor at age a after t years of service, 
but who delays receipt of pension benefits until the plan's normal retire 
ment age. The normal and early retirement ages assumed for this stylized 
plan are 65 and 55 respectively. Terminating workers are, however, eligible 
for early retirement benefits. Our hypothetical plan reduces benefits by d 
percent for each year that early retirement precedes normal retirement. The 
benefit reduction rate, d, could be greater than, equal to, or less than the 
actuarial fair rate. Today most plans offering early retirement appear to 
stipulate less than actuarially fair reduction rates; consequently, the formu 
lae presented here assume that workers always gain by receiving their 
vested accrued benefits at the earliest possible date.
The function A(55) is the actuarial discount factor that transforms benefit 
flows initiating at age 55 into expected stocks of pension wealth at age 55. 
Expectations here are taken with respect to longevity. Thus A(55) is the 
annuity value of a dollar's worth of pension benefits to be received each 
year until death, beginning at age 55. For simplicity assume that the prob 
ability of dying prior to age 55 is zero. Hence, the present value at age a of 
A(55) is A(a) = A(55) (l+r)~<55 ~ a) for a < 55. If pension benefits are 
determined as a constant \ times the product of final year's earnings and 
service, and there is no offset for receipt of social security benefits, B(a,t) 
is simply:






R(a,t), for t increasing pari-passus with age, is zero prior to t equals 9 
and jumps at t equals 9 to the value given in (A3). Cliff vesting thus pro 
duces spikes in the accrual profile such as that in figure 2.2 at 10 years of 
service. Between the age at cliff vesting and age 55, pension wealth Pw(a) 
is given by:
(A4) Pw(a) = XW(a)(l+d)- |0(l+r) " (55 - a)A(55)t,





Equations (A5) and (A3) suggest a drop in R(a,t) as a increases to a + 1 
concurrent with an increase in t from 9 to 10. Equation (A5) will be posi 
tive if the term in brackets exceeds zero. This will be the case if the percent 
increase in the wage plus the percent increase in years employed (1/t) is 
greater than zero. Assuming the term in brackets is positive and is roughly 
constant, R(a,t) will increase exponentially due to the exponential decline 
in the discount factor, (l+r)~ |55 ~ (a+l)l , as a approaches 55.
If the value of d is considerably less than actuarially fair, a discontinuity 
in R(a,t) occurs at the early retirement age, 55. At ages 55 and 56 we have:
(A6) Pw(55) = \W(55)(l+d)~ loA(55)t,
and
(A7) Pw(56) = \W(56)(l+dr9A(56)(t+l).
Hence,
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Assuming wage growth at 54 is close to that at 55 and A(56) approximately 
equals A(55), then R(55,t) primarily differs from R(54,t—1) because the 
first terms in the bracket in (A5) is now multiplied by (1+d) while the 
second term, — 1, is multiplied by (1+r). Since r exceeds d by assumption, 
R(55,t) can easily be less than R(54,t—1). Indeed, this change in the func 
tional form of R(a,t) can produce sharp drops in accrual rates at the early 
retirement age for a host of pension plans and a range of realistic economic 
assumptions. Figure 2.2 illustrates such discontinuities.
It is important to realize that the early retirement reduction, lower wages, 
and one less year of tenure yield lower benefits at 55 than at 56. The early 
retirement reduction reduces benefits at the rate d. But if benefits were 
taken at 55 they could accrue interest at the rate r. Thus by foregoing the 
early retirement option of receiving benefits at 55, a cost is incurred that 
depends on the difference r — d. If this loss is not offset by the increase 
due to wage growth and one year of additional tenure, there will be a drop 
in the benefit accrual rate between 55 and 56.
The same considerations pertain to benefit increments between 56 and 
65. Recall that we have assumed a less than fair early retirement reduction 
so that benefits accrued before 55 are valued assuming receipt of benefits at 
the age that yields maximum pension wealth. The optimum time to receive 
benefits accrued between 55 and 56 is 56, between 56 and 57 it is 57, and 
so forth. But to gain benefits from working another year, it is necessary to 
forego the option of immediately taking accrued benefits at an advanta 
geous reduction rate.
Between ages 56 and 65, R(a,t) equals:
(A9) R(a,t) = \(l+dr(65 ~ a) (l+r)A(a)t
W(a+l) (t+1) A(a+l) (1+d)
W(a) t (a) (1+r)
In contrast to the R(a,t) formula in (A5) applying to the period between 
cliff vesting and early retirement, (A9) indicates that the actuarial reduction 
factor—rather than the interest rate r—imparts an upward tilt in the R(a,t) 
profile between early and normal retirement, as long as the term in brackets 
is positive. In (A9) as in (A5) and (A8) the accrual rate, R(a,t) is an in 
creasing function of the rate of nominal wage growth. Larger nominal in 
terest rates reduce accrual rates at all ages, with a negative interaction with 
age prior to early retirement.
Finally, while equation (9) is unlikely to be negative, wide differences 
between wage growth and the interest rate r can yield negative increments 
in pension wealth after the early retirement age. To a first approximation,
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the bracketed term in equation (9) will be positive if AW/W + 1/t > r - d 
where AW/W is the percent increase in wages, and 1/t is the percent in 
crease in tenure. It is easy to see, however, that low wage growth and high 
interest rates will yield negative increments. Thus actuarial increments after 
the early retirement age are very sensitive to assumed rates of wage growth 
and interest.
Appendix II 
Decomposition of Pension Accrual
The calculations underlying the pension accrual in figures 5.1-5.6 are 
explained in this section. The wage earnings and other dollar values in this 
section are in current dollars, however, while the graphs are in constant 
1985 dollars. The nominal interest rate assumed throughout this analysis is 
0.09, and the real interest is assumed to equal 0.03.
The calculations are shown in appendix table 22 for male managers who 
were born in 1930 and hired by the firm in 1960, the same group whose 
accrual profile is illustrated in figure 5.1. Columns (1) through (4) are self- 
explanatory. Column (5) is the average earnings base used to calculate pen 
sion benefits. The normal retirement benefit is shown in column (6). It is 
calculated using the formula in equation 10 above. The social security ben 
efit in column (7) is calculated by the FIRM based on earnings projected 
forward to age 65. Column (8) is the social security adjustment. Column 
(9) is (7) minus (8). Column (10) is 1 minus the early retirement adjust 
ment, the proportion of the benefit that remains after the adjustment. Once 
the person has worked for 30 years there is, according to the FIRM'S early 
retirement reduction provisions, no reduction even though the person is 
only 60 years old at that time.
The numbers in column (11) equal the numbers in column (10) multiplied 
by those in column (6). It is the benefit that a person who retired early 
would receive between the early retirement age and age 65. After age 65, 
benefits are based on the adjusted retirement benefits, reduced by the early 
retirement reduction factor. These benefits are shown in column (12), which 
is (10) times (9).
The annuity value of a dollar received each year from 65 until death is 
shown in column (13) of appendix table 22. It accounts for the probability 
that a person will be alive at each year in the future. The probability that a 
person will live from the current age until 65 is shown in column (14). The 
current value of a dollar that will be received at age 65 is shown in column 
(15). At the current age, the present value of the pension benefits that 
the manager can receive at age 65 is shown in column (16) and is given by 
(12) x (13) x (14) x (15).
If the manager retires at age 55 or later, he will receive benefits until age 
65 that are not reduced by the social security adjustment. He receives the 
normal retirement benefits in column (6) reduced only by the early retire 
ment reduction factor, (10), and shown in column (11). The present value of 
these benefits from the year of first collection until age 65 is shown in
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column (17). These benefits plus those that will be received after age 65, 
are the present value of his pension wealth and are shown in column (18) 
((16) plus (17)).
The change in pension wealth from one year to the next, the pension 
accrual, is shown in column (19). Recall that accrual at age a, I(a), is given 
by
(10) I(a) = Pw(a+l) - Pw(a)(l+r)
where a is pension wealth and r is the nominal interest rate, taken to be 
0.09. Again, these pension accruals, together with social security accruals 
and the wage, are graphed in figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.5, but in 1985 dollars. 




Earnings histories from 1969 are available for workers employed during 
the period 1980 through 1984. To explain the main features of the estima 
tion procedure, appendix figure 1 describes the earnings of two persons 
who are in the data set for seven years. The first person is age 40 to 46 over 
these seven years, and the second is age 45 to 51. (They could also have 
different years of service, but that is ignored in this example.) Earnings by 
age for the typical person in the FIRM are represented by the solid line in 
the middle of the graph. The first person has higher earnings than the av 
erage employee. His earnings exceed those of the typical person by an 
amount u,, the individual-specific earnings effect for person 1. It may 
arise, for example, because this person works harder than the typical em 
ployee or because he has greater ability or more training. Earnings for per 
son 1 fluctuate from year to year, however. The deviations with age from 
the central tendency of his earnings, indicated by the person 1 average, are
FIGURE A.I - Illustration of individual-specific earnings effects
Person 1 Average. 
o ----"
Person 2 Average
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indicated by n lt , where t indicates the deviation in year t. Future earnings 
for person 1 must be estimated for our analysis. They are indicated by the 
dashed part of the line. They depend on u, and on the estimated relationship 
between age and earnings, which, aside from the individual-specific term, 
is assumed to be the same for individuals within a sex-occupation group.
The implications of the estimates are shown for male managers in appen 
dix figure 2. It shows earnings profiles for managers by age of hire in 1980, 
where the nine profiles on the graph pertain to persons hired at successively 
older ages—from 20 to 60 in five-year intervals. Earnings are calculated 
through age 70 for each cohort. First, it is clear that, for any age, earnings 
increase substantially with years of service. Earnings at the time of hire 
increase with age, but the bulk of the difference in earnings is accounted 
for by years of service in the FIRM. For example, persons who are 55 and 
just hired (profile 8) earn much less than those who are 55, but have been 
working for the FIRM since age 20 (profile 1). Finally, the decline in earn 
ings for older workers is much greater for long-term employees than for 
those who have been hired recently.
Similar patterns apply to other employee groups, (graphs not shown), but 
with some significant variations. The earnings of male office workers at
FIGURE A.2 - Age-earnings profiles for persons hired in 1980, 
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the time of hire vary greatly by age, increasing and then declining rapidly. 
The importance of these profiles for our work is that future expected earn 
ings depend in an important way on the age and years of service of an 
employee, and the employee group.
In our prediction of earnings beyond 1984 we use the 1984 year dummy 
and add a 1.5 percent real wage growth factor; i.e., the predicted earnings 
for year t is the predicted earnings for 1984 times (1.5)(t— 1984).
Earnings Equation Specification
To simplify the presentation, we include only one right-hand variable, 
age. In practice estimation is based on age and years of service. The exact 
specification is presented below. An earnings equation that captures the 
ideas discussed above is:
(A 10) In Elt = Po +p,AIt + p2A; + €„
Var(e lt ) = Var(u,) + Var(-r] It ) = a6 , Var(u,) = o , Var^,,) = a
Cov(u,,T] |t ) = Cov(T] 1( ,Tl lt ,) = 0
E = Annual earnings 
A = Age
i = Indexes individuals
t = Indexes year (e.g., 1978, . . . , 1983) 
u, = Individual-specific earnings effect 
Elt = eV" = e*"eV"
ECEJu^u.) = e'V'Efe11") = eV1 ( 1 + y) .
The last approximation arises because of the nonlinear relationship between 
earnings and age; i.e., the expected value of exp [T],,] is not equal to 1, 
even though the expected value of TJU is 0.
In addition to the parameters (3, the variances of u and iq are also of 
interest. The first indicates the systematic earnings variation across individ 
uals due to individual-specific effects. The second is a measure of the extent 
of nonsystematic variation. The method of estimation used here does not 
allow for the possibility that the individual-specific terms u may be corre 
lated with age. For example, it may be that persons whose earnings are 
higher, because of the attributes u, are more likely to continue working at
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older ages. We did obtain such estimates using a differencing procedure. 
But for our purposes the procedure has two important shortcomings: First, 
it means that certain age and service parameters are not identified. Second, 
it imposes the rate of salary increase by age that existed over the period of 
the data, because this relationship depends only on changes in earnings 
over the period of the data. (The method we use allows the effect of age to 
be determined in part by comparison of the earnings of workers with very 
different ages.) This increase is apparently low relative to longer term in 
creases, and hence may imply expected future increases with age and ser 
vice that are too low. We also discovered that individual-specific terms 
based on the method that we have used are not correlated with firm depar 
ture rates.
Estimation Method
Estimation of equation (A 10) yields residuals
e lt = In Elt - go - P,A,« - P2A,2t . 
The estimated variance of elt is given by
(All)
Sn,-k
where n, is the number of observations for person i and k is the number of 
parameters (3 in this example). To obtain estimates of additional parameters 
of interest we need to distinguish persons with more than one observation 
from those with only 1 .
a. Using Persons With n, > 2
From the residuals for person i the individual-specific effect for i is cal 
culated by
(A12) u, =
The variances T) and u are then given, respectively, by
* (e,,-u,)2 
(A13) 6-2 = '^——————— 
S n,- k - I
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and
(A 14) Var(u.) = Var(elt ) - Var(nlt)
where I is the number of persons in the sample (in this instance those with 
n, > 2), and
(A15) f| lt = elt - u, .
b. For Persons With n, = 1
If a person has only one observation we can't distinguish r\ lt from u,, 
since we don't observe any variation around an average. First note that if u 
and T| are normally distributed, and thus e lt is also,
E(u.) + pu ,e — (e lt - £(€„))
= 0 + Pu .e - (€„ - 0)
= PU, - .
Cov(uul ,elt ) = E[u,(u,+T] lt )] = aj ,
Cov(u,e) CTU a.
PU .€ =
Vvar(u)" Vvar(e) <ru VCTJ + a^ ae
where p is a correlation coefficient. Thus
, >u I €) = — e = ——— ~ • e .2lt
*-' f.
If a^ were 0 and we observed elt , we would assume it represented entirely 
an individual-specific effect u,. If o^ were 0, we would assume the e lt were
1 12 Appendix
equal to the random term TJ,,, and that there was no individual effect u,. 
Letting e lt be the sample analog of elt and using the estimates in (19) and 







For estimation of the likelihood that a person will retire in the next year, 
we need to use predicted earnings in that year. For future analysis we also 
need to predict earnings in subsequent years as well. The predictions are 
given by
(A 17) Elt = e 11 " eQ ' E^") = e^" + °' (1 + o^/2) for n, > 2
Elt = e 11 " e"" E^") = e*" + "' (1 + aJ/2) for n, = 1 .
For out-of-sample estimates, |i lt would be predicted from future age, for 
example. '
d. The Estimated Components of Earnings
To consider how much earnings deviate from what might be predicted for 
that person, or from what that person himself might predict, it is useful to 
divide earnings into expected and unexpected components. We do that by 
defining
(A18) In Elt = (i lt + u, + f| lt
|iu + u = "permanent" or "expected" component 
f| l( = "transitory" or "unexpected" component.
These definitions do not necessarily correspond to usual definitions of per 
manent versus transitory income, so the expected versus unexpected termi 
nology may be better. In levels the two components are given by
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(A 19) Elt = e""" + "' • e*1 "
permanent transitory 
component component
A More Detailed Specification of the Earnings Function 
Earnings were predicted using the following variables:
Age
Age Squared
Age Squared X Service
Service
Service Squared
Service Squared x Age
Age x Service
Age Squared x Service Squared
Calendar Year Variables for 1969, . . . ,1979 and 1981, ...,
1983.
The calendar year variables pick up changes in real earnings over time. 
Each of the year estimates is relative to the 1980 base. The estimated earn 
ings function parameters are shown in appendix table 23.
NOTE
1. Simulated actual future earnings could be obtained by taking a random 
draw T) lt from the estimate distribution of r\, N(0,d2), for each future year 
and using the average value of e^" "' e11 ' 1 . In this case there is no need to 
use the nonlinearity correction.
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Table A.I
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With 
















































































































































































































































































































a. Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
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Table A.2
Dispersion of Accrual Ratios for Table 1 Plans With Age 


























































































































































































































































Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans 
With 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early Retirement at Age 55, by 



















































































































































































































































a Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
Table A.4
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With 10-Year Cliff Vesting and 


































































































































































































































































Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With 10-Year Cliff Vesting and 






















































































































































































































































a. Men only. There were no plans with the provisions corresponding to the two deleted categories under the 55 normal retirement heading.
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Table A.5
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings and Flat 
Plans With 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early or Normal Retirement 
















































































































































































































































a. There are no plans in the 62-65 or in the 65-65 early-normal retirement groups.
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Table A.6
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Flat Rate Plans With 




















































































































































































































































































































a Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded
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Table A.7
Dispersion of Accrual Rates for Table 4.3 Plans With Age 


























































































































































































































































Loss in Expected Pension Wealth if Change to No-Pension Job,
as Percent of Expected Wages, by Age of Job Change and by







































































































































































Loss in Expected Pension Wealth if Change to No-Pension Job,
as Percent of Expected Wages, by Age of Job Change and by
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Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans
With 10-year Cliff Vesting, by Early and Normal Retirement


























































































































































































































a Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded
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lable A. 12
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans
With 10-Year Cliff Vesting, by Early and Normal Retirement













































































































































































a. Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
Table A. 13
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With 10-Year Cliff Vesting 


































































































































.187 .119 .063 
.211 .134 .074 
.240 .158 .087
-.008 .100 .067 
-.178 099 .072 
-.025 103 .079 
-.035 .102 .081 
-.046 .098 .084 
-.057 .096 .074 
-.068 .101 .074
-.079 -.080 .071 
-.088 -.087 .070 
-.099 -.095 .068
-.288 -.158 -.141 
-.288 -.174 -.152 
-.288 -.189 -.161 
-.288 -.204 -.170 
-.288 -.216 -.177
Transportation
55 55 55 
55 62 65
120 37 37
.211 .178 .098 
.238 .201 .111 
.269 .228 . 127
-.003 .078 .091 
-.011 .093 .094 
-.019 .126 .100 
-.028 .126 .103 
-.036 .125 .109 
-.045 .098 .093 
-.054 .087 .086
-.062 -.077 .063 
-.071 -.085 .062 
-.080 -.094 .058
-.300 -.242 -.206 
-.301 -.276 -.217 
-.302 -.309 -.227 
-.302 -.320 -.237 
-.302 -.329 -.246
Retail Trade
55 55 55 
55 62 65
2 6 90
.163 .025 .046 
.172 .080 .050 
.196 .098 .056
-.182 .087 .034 
-.176 .084 .032 
-.171 .114 .027 
-.167 .107 .018 
-.164 .097 .018 
-.161 .070 .013 
-.159 .045 .002
-.158 -.040 -.017 
-.159 -.054 -.027 
- 106 -.068 -.059
-040 -.160 -.156 
-.044 -.158 -.158 
-.048 -.157 -.160 






.230 .193 .104 
.267 .220 .122 
.306 .250 .146
.092 .141 .092 
.083 .140 .096 
.083 .143 .104 
.074 . 140 . 108 
.064 .134 .110 
-.052 .054 .099 
-.065 .044 .098
-.078 -.093 .097 
-.088 -.100 .098 
-.099 -.108 .096
-.150 -.187 -.167 
-.206 -.214 -.175 
-.256 -.238 -.192 
-.300 -.245 -.207 
-.339 -.251 -.222
Services
55 55 55 
55 62 65
3 3 33
.200 .142 .075 
.226 .160 .086 
.254 .182 .098
-.010 .162 .082 
-.018 .161 087 
-.027 .158 096 
-.035 .153 .106 
-.045 .1248 .112 
-.053 .277 .080 
-.062 .367 .075
-.072 -.075 .069 
-.081 -.086 .063 
-.090 -.096 .054
-.316 -.406 -.144 
-.311 -.400 - 152 
-.807 -.395 -.158 
-.302 -.390 -.164 
-.297 -.384 -.169
tooo
a. Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
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Table A. 14
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With 










































































































































a Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.
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Table A.15
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent of Earnings Plans With
10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early Retirement at Age 55, by Normal










































































































































a. Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded
Table A.16 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a. f-statistics are in parentheses.
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